UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1999/876
12 August 1999

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 11 AUGUST 1999 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF LIBERIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to quote hereunder the text of a self-explanatory note verbale addressed to you by my Government, and request that the said text be circulated as a document of the Security Council:

"The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Liberia has the honour to inform the Secretary-General that the Government of Liberia has received security reports, which have been confirmed, of an armed incursion into Liberian territory from the Republic of Guinea along the Liberian-Guinean border in the Foya District of Lofa County, Liberia.

"The Ministry wishes to further inform the Secretary-General that the armed incursion begun at 5 a.m. on Tuesday, 10 August 1999. The following border villages in Lofa County, Liberia, are under the control of the attackers from Guinea: Konjo Sarhdu, Benduma, Mendekorma and the major town of Kolahun.

"The Government of Liberia has submitted a note of protest to the Government of Guinea through its representative at Monrovia, and has demanded that the Government takes the necessary steps to bring this situation under control. The Government of Guinea was also informed that the Government of Liberia reserved the right to defend its territorial integrity against such aggression.

"The Ministry of Foreign Affairs wishes to inform the Secretary-General that this is the second incursion into Liberia from Guinea; the first occurred on 21 April 1999.

"While the Ministry of Foreign Affairs will keep the Secretary-General of the United Nations apprised of the situation as it further develops, it would be appreciated if this information is brought to the urgent attention of the Security Council.

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

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S/1999/877
12 August 1999

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 12 AUGUST 1999 FROM THE CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to transmit herewith a list of cases of violations by Iraq of the terms of the ceasefire between the two countries from 21 January to 3 July 1998 (see annex).

I should be grateful if the present letter and its annex were circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Mehdi DANESH-YAZDI
Ambassador
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

99-23567 (E) 180899

/...

Annex

1 On 21 January 1998, at 1030 hours, three Iraqi military personnel embarked on disassembling a small antenna, and replacing it with a big one of 5 m long on the Feiz hill located at the GCs of 38S NC 8780013700 on the map of Halala, in NML, north of border pillar 35/3 and southwest of border pillar 35/4 at the Meimak heights.

2. On 21 January 1998, ninety five Iraqi motor boats, carrying around one hundred and eighty individuals, were observed patrolling on the Arvand river.

3. On 22 January 1998, eleven Iraqi boats carrying a number of individuals, infiltrated 15 km across the border into the territory of the Islamic Republic of Iran at the GCs of 38R QV 7000072000 on the map of west of Hoor Al-Hoveiza, 15 km northwest of border pillar 14/A7 and intended to approach the Shaheed Bakkeri base. They fled away upon reaction made by the Iranian boundary police.

4. On 23 January 1998, at 1830 hours, the Iranian boundary police intercepted several Iraqi smugglers who intended to infiltrating across the border and heading from west to east of the Shaheed Bakkeri base in the west of Hoveiza area. As a result of the clash which followed, one of the intruders was killed.

5. On 25 January1998, thirty eight Iraqi motor boats, carrying one hundred individuals, were observed patrolling along the Arvand river.

6. On 26 January 1998, at 1610 hours, one Iraqi loader and one truck were observed excavating around the GCs of 38R TP 5300026000 and on the map of Khosro-Abad, in NML, north of the Ma'ameer river and south of the Othman river, between the Seid Ussof and Seid Shahab rivers.

7. On 26 January 1998, eighty Iraqi motor boats, carrying around two hundred and ten individuals, were observed patrolling along the Arvand river.

8. On 27 January 1998, at 1030 hours, two patrol vehicles, carrying seven armed individuals in camouflage clothing, were seen at the Sar-Ghazal of Iraq located at the GCs of 38S ND66100, 30300 on the map of Ghasr-Shirin, in NML, north of border pillar 60/6 opposite Bashkan of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

9. On 27 January 1998, seventy nine Iraqi motor boats carrying round one hundred and twenty five individuals were observed patrolling along the Arvand river.

10. On 28 January 1998, at 1020 hours, two Iraqi military personnel were seen moving around the GCs of 38S NC 88000127000 on the map of Halala, in the NML, north of border pillar 35/3, on the hill 450 located at the Meimak heights.

11. On 29 January 1998, fifty Iraqi motor boats, carrying around ninety individuals, were observed patrolling along the Arvand river.

12. On 30 January 1998, at 0930 to 1400 hours, nine Iraqi military personnel and two Kurds were observed around the GCs of 38S ND 4800032000 on the map of Ghasr-e-Shirin, north of border pillar 59.

13. On 30 January 1998, at 1340 hours, the Iranian boundary police belonging to the Khoram-Shahr sentry post observed one Iraqi painted vehicle, carrying six individuals, moving from the west towards the south.

14. On 30 January 1998, fifty six Iraqi motor boats, carrying around eighty five individuals, were observed patrolling on the Arvand river.

15. On 2 February 1998, at 1645 hours, two Iraqi boats carrying four individuals infiltrated across the border into the territory of the Islamic Republic of Iran at the GCs of 38R QV 5600073000 on the map of southern Hoor Al-Hoveiza, between northeast and southeast of border pillars 14/A7 and 14B, in NML. They fled away upon proper reaction made by the Iranian boundary police.

16. On 2 February 1998, one vehicle having aboard four Iraqi individuals in civilian clothing visited the town of Mondaria at the GCs of 38S NS 420000400 on the map of Khosravi west of border pillar 53/1. It left the area later on.

17. On 3 February 1998, thirty five Iraqi motor boats, carrying around one hundred and ten individuals, were observed patrolling along the Arvand river.

18. On 4 February 1998, at 0810 hours, fifteen Iraqi military personnel were observed attending training courses around the GCs of 38S ND 3900012700 on the map of Khosravi, west of border pillar 59/1.

19. On 5 February 1998, at 1340 hours, one Iraqi boat carrying two individuals was observed at GCs of 38R QV 5500073000 on the map of southern Hoor Al-Hoveiza, in NML, between north and south of border pillars 14/A7 and 14B.

20. On 5 February 1998, six Iraqi vehicles carrying military personnel were observed displacing forces in the border area opposite Khosravi.

21. On 6 February 1998, one hundred Iraqi motor boats, carrying around one hundred and fifty individuals, were observed patrolling along the Arvand river.

22. On 8 February 1998, at 0950 hours, fourteen Iraqi vehicles were observed moving around the GCs of 38S ND 6200024000 and the GCs 38S ND 52800240900 on the map of Ghasr-Shirin, in NML, west of Madjid Ghadir-Agha and west of Pirooz Khan.

23. On 8 February 1998, at various times, seventy Iraqi motor boats carrying around one hundred and sixty individuals, were observed patrolling along the Arvand river.

24. On 8 February 1998, eleven Iraqi shepherds were observed pasturing their sheep in the area across from Sumar and Naft-Shahr.

25. On 9 February 1998, at various times, eighty Iraqi motor boats, carrying around one hundred and eighty individuals, were observed patrolling along the Arvand river.

26. On 10 February 1998, at 1000 hours, one loader and one crane belonging to the Iraqi forces were observed operating at the GCs of 38S ND 5700037000 on the map of Sumar, south of Komasang mountain, between north and south of border pillars 40/4 and 40/5.

27. On 10 February 1998, at 1130 hours, one hundred and twenty Iraqi officers visited the base located at the GCs of 38S ND 6400028000 on the map of Kani-Sheikh, in the NML, south of border pillar 39/5.

28. On 10 February 1998, at 1600 hours, six Iraqi armed smugglers took three farmers hostage in the Abujamoosa area, Shahrestan district. Upon spreading news in the area and reaction made by some twenty locals threatening the bandits of restoring the force, they released the hostages and fled.

29. On 11 February 1998, at 0930 hours, one Iraqi vehicle carrying ten individuals was observed moving at the GCs of 38S NC 4510056500 on the map of southern Naft-Shahr, in the NML, south of border pillar 44/9.

30. On 11 February 1998, at 2100 hours, two grenades were launched by some unidentified individuals (probably MKO terrorists) from inside Iraqi territory at the base of the Iranian boundary police located at the Shohada hill, in the Mehran area and the Meimak heights, near the southern Helala border base. The invaders fled and no casualty was reported.

31. On 11 February 1998, at different hours, twenty five Iraqi motor boats, carrying around one hundred and seventy five individuals, were observed patrolling along the Arvand river.

32. On 12 February 1998, seventy Iraqi motor boats, carrying around one hundred and fifty individuals, were observed patrolling along the Arvand river.

33. On 13 February 1998, at 1500 hours, one bulldozer and one loaders were observed operating at the GCs of 38R TP 5500020000 on the map of Faw.

34. On 13 February 1998, at 2000 hours, fifty vehicles belonging to the Iraqi forces were observed moving at the GCs of 38S ND 6000053000 on the map of Chafta west of border pillar 62/5 and at the GCs of 38S ND 6200030000 on the map of Ghasr-Shirin. Moreover, forty nine vehicles equipped with one rifle gun were observed moving towards the GCs of 38S ND 5400024000 on the map of Ghasr-Shirin, in the NML, north of Ahmad-Abad of Iraq.

35. On 13 February1998, seventy Iraqi motor boats, carrying around one hundred and sixty individuals, were observed patrolling along the Arvand river.

36. On 14 February 1998, at 2315 hours, forty Iraqi military personnel were observed displacing (ammunition probably) at the GCs of 39R TP 4800034000 on the map of Khosro-Abad.

37. On 14 February 1998, ninety Iraqi motor boats and one tug boat, carrying around two hundred individuals, were observed patrolling along the Arvand river.

38. At 14 February 1998, one Iraqi grader and two loaders belonging to the Iraqi forces were observed operating at the GCs of 39R TP 5300026000 on the map of Khosro-Abad, in the NML, north of the Maamir river, south of the Othman river and between the Seid Ussof and Seid Shahab rivers of Iran.

39. On 15 February1998, at different hours, sixty three Iraqi motor boats and one tug boat, carrying around one hundred and seventy five individuals, were observed patrolling along the Arvand river.

40. On 16 February 1998, activities in order to dig three to four oil wells and daily movements of workers and engineers were observed in the area between the Iraqi Sharahani and Abo-Ghoraib sentry posts.

41. On 17 February 1998, at 2315 hours, the Iranian boundary police ambushed two Iraqis who had infiltrated across the border into Iranian territory around the GCs of 39R TP 1700095000 on the map of Nim-Eistgah-Navad. The infiltrators fled back into Iraqi territory.

42. On 17 February 1998, at different hours, sixty four Iraqi motor boats, carrying around one hundred and forty individuals, were observed patrolling along the Arvand river.

43. On 19 February 1998, at 0700 hours, the Iranian boundary police intercepted a number of armed Iraqi smugglers who had infiltrated across the border into Iranian territory around the GCs of 38S ND 6830023400 on the map of Ghasr-e-Shirin in the NML south of border pillar 60/1. As result, the infiltrators fled back into Iraqi territory leaving behind some quantity of alcoholic beverage.

44. On 20 February 1998, at different hours, fourteen Iraqi motor boats, carrying around forty five individuals, were observed patrolling along the Arvand river.

45. On 21 February 1998, at 1700 hours, one Iraqi crane belonging to the Iraqi forces was observed carrying one Iraqi sunk launch at the GCs of 39R TP 5500002000 on the map of Faw, in the NML.

46. On 22 February 1998, at 1530 hours, a number of Iraqi military personnel installed a group tent at the GCs of 39R TP 3900057000 on the map Abadan, in the NML, east of Al-Zadiaee.

47. On 22 February 1998, at various hours, sixty five Iraqi motor boats, carrying around one hundred sixteen individuals, were observed patrolling along the Arvand river.

48. On 23 February 1998, at 1255 hours, two Iraqi vehicles having on board eleven armed individuals were observed visiting bases located at the GCs of 39R TQ 1600031000 on the map of Hosseinia, in the NML, south of border pillar 11 and north of border pillar 10.

49. On 23 February 1998, at 2000 hours, Iraqi troops fired two illuminators inside or Iraqi territory across from the Talaeea area.

50. On 23 February 1998, at various hours, twelve Iraqi motor boats and one tug boat, carrying around thirty five individuals, were observed patrolling along the Arvand river.

51. On 24 February 1998, at various hours, thirty six Iraqi motor boats, carrying around sixty individuals, were observed patrolling along the Arvand river.

52. On 25 February 1998, at 1000 hours, Iraqi forces embarked on installing one Grinov rifle gun at the GC of 39R TQ 1580013000 on the map of Hosseinia, in the NML, south of border pillar 7/21.

53. On 25 February 1998, at various hours, forty Iraqi motor boats, carrying around eighty five individuals, were observed patrolling along the Arvand river.

54. On 26 February 1998, at 1300 hours, one antenna was observed on top of a water tank located at northwest of the Bahram-Abad sentry post, Mehran district, 4/5 km inside of Iraqi territory.

55. On 27 February 1998, at 0555 hours, five red illuminating devices were observed at altitude of 100m around the GCs of 39R TP 2580062300 on the map of Khoram-Shahr, opposite the Minoo island of Iran, east of Al-Ghata and north of Seihan of Iraq, on the other side of border.

56. On 27 February 1998, at 2020 and 2021 hours, Iraqi troops fired two illuminating shots in the border area opposite Shalamcha.

57. On 28 February 1200 hours, Iraqi troops leveled the reedy lands and constructed strongholds in the area opposite the Abo-Hamid and Salim rivers, on the other side of border.

58. On 28 February 1998, at various hours, eighty two Iraqi motor boats, carrying around one hundred twenty individuals, were observed patrolling along the Arvand river.

59. On 29 February 1998, at 0815 hours, a mechanical shovel belonging to the Iraqi forces were observed operating at the GCs of 39R TP 5200026000 on the map of Khosro-Abad, in the NML, of the Ma'amir river of Iraq, south of the Othman river, opposite the area between the Seid Ussof and Seid Shahab river.

60. On 3 March 1998, at various hours, eight two Iraqi motor boats, carrying around one hundred twenty individuals, were observed patrolling along the Arvand river.

61. On 3 March 1998, the MKO terrorist group admitted death of five elements of its own in a clash taken place on 29 February 1998 in the Ilam area's border strip. The names of the dead, as mentioned by their radio, are as follows: Abas Ali Bagheri, Assadollah Randjbari-Moghadan, Mehdi Mosleh, Mansoor Beheshti and Mossa Heidarzadeh.

62. On 10 March 1998, six Iraqis were observed constructing observing post around the Mondaria sentry post, in the NML, in the Khosravi border area.

63. On 11 March 1998, at various hours, seventy seven Iraqi motor boats, carrying around one hundred seventy individuals, were observed patrolling along the Arand river.

64. On 13 March 1998, sixty five Iraqi motor boats, carrying around one hundred and seventy individuals, were observed patrolling along the Arvand river.

65. On 14 March 1998, at 1300 hours, one Iraqi grader was observed operating at the GCs of 39R QV 5500069000 on the map of southern Hoor-Al-Hoveiza, in the NML, northwest of border pillar 14/A6 and southwest of border pillar 14/A7.

66. On 14 March 1998, at 1825 hours, one Iraqi vehicle carrying fifteen individuals was observed moving around the GCs of 39R QV 5500073000 on the map of southern Hoor Al-Hoveiza, in the NML, north of border pillar 14/A7 and south of border pillar 14/B.

67. On 14 March 1998, Iraqi military personnel installed two tents at the GCs of 39R TP 1400078000 on the map of Nim-Eistgah Navad, in the NML, west of border pillar 5 and at the GCs of 39R TP 1300078000 on the map of Nim-Eistgah Navad.

68. On 15 March 1998, fifty Iraqi motor boats, carrying around eighty five individuals, were observed patrolling along the Arvand river.

69. On 15 March 1998, two helicopters belonging to the Iraqi forces were observed flying over the Khosro-Abad's border strip in the Abadan area.

70. On 15 March 1998, two Iraqi Kurds were observed moving and patrolling in the border area opposite Ghasr-e-Shirin.

71. On 16 March 1998, Iraqi troops withdrew armaments and equipments, including personnel carriers equipped with Doshka rifles, communications devices and missile sites, existing at the GCs of 39R TP 1300077000 on the map of Khoram-Shahr, in the NML, west of border pillars 4/2-4/3.

72. On 16 March 1998, at various hours, ninety five Iraqi motor boats, carrying around one hundred and ninety individuals, were observed patrolling along the Arvand river.

73. On 17 March 1998, at 1140 hours, five Iraqi military personnel aboard a patrol vehicle were observed patrolling at the border zero point opposite the Shohada-Shalamcha border (Khomram-Shahr).

74. On 17 March 1998, at various hours, forty five Iraqi motor boats, carrying around eighty individuals, were observed patrolling along the Arvand river.

75. On 18 March 1998, one hundred and twenty Iraqi motor boats, carrying around two hundred and thirty five individuals, were observed patrolling along the Arvand river.

76. On 20 March 1998, at 0930 hours, one Iraqi vessel collided with one Iranian fishing boat around GCs of 39R TP 5900017000 on the Alishir river, Arvand waterway. As a result, the Iranian boat sank, one of the individual aboard of it was injured and the Iraqi vessel left the area.

77. On 20 March 1998, at 1300 hours, one Iraqi trailer loaded with connex [container] and carrying four individuals left the Halvan intersection at the GCs of 38S ND 3800011000 on the map of Khosravi, between west of border pillars 54 and 55 towards te Mondaria sentry post at the GCs of 38S ND 4200005000 on the map of Khosravi. It left the area after unloading the cargo.

78. On 20 March 1998, at 1830 hours, one Iraqi jeep dropped eight armed individuals around the village of Madjid-Ghadir-Agha at the 38S ND 6280024700 on the map of Ghasr-Shirin, in the NML.

79. On 20 March 1998, fourteen Iraqi military personnel were observed patrolling at the GCs of 38S ND 5200097000 on the map of NML, west of border pillar 48, in the Zein Alkosh area (Zein Alghos) and at the GCs of 38 NC 4500099000 on the map of Khosravi, in the NML, north of Chizard sentry post, south of border pillars, 51-52, on the map of Kharatiha.

80. On 20 March 1998, fifty five Iraqi motor boats, carrying around one thousand two hundred individuals, were observed patrolling along the Arvand area.

81. On 21 March 1998, at 0830 to 0910 hours, around twenty Iraqi military personnel were observed attending training courses at the observing post 408 located at the GCs of 38S ND 3090012700 on the map of Khosravi.

82. On 21 March 1998, at 0845 hours, three Iraqi soldiers were observed patrolling at the GCs of 38S PB 0030081500 on the map of Saleh-Abad, 10 km west of border pillar 33/10, around the Kani-Sheikh sentry post.

83. On 21 March 1998, at 1700 hours, one Iraqi bulldozer was observed operating at the GCs of 38S NC 8780013700 on the map of Halala, in the NML, north of border pillar 35/3 and west of border pillar 35/4, on the Meimak heights.

84. On 21 March 1998, twenty two Iraqi motor boats, carrying around sixty five individuals, were observed patrolling along the Arvand river.

85. On 22 March 1998, at 1420 hours, two white passenger cars with red and grey fenders left the town of Taeeb towards the graveled road and stopped in front of the Ein-Manssour sentry post, Dehloran district. The individuals aboard two cars, in civilian clothing and equipped with binoculars and arms, embarked on shooting in direction of territory of the Islamic Republic of Iran after having taken their meal. The Iranian boundary police based at the area reciprocated.

86. On 22 March 1998, at 1715 hours, Iraqi forces embarked on installing an anti-air craft gun at the GCs of 38R QV 3500050000 on the map of western Jofeir (2), northwest and southwest of border pillars 14/A4 and 14/A5, in the NML.

87. On 22 March 1998, thirty Iraqi motor boats, carrying around sixty individuals, were observed patrolling along the Arvand river.

88. On 23 March 1998, at 2240 hours, two unidentified aircraft were observed flying around the GCs of 39R TP 5900017000 on the map of Nahr Alishir towards the Persian Gulf, on the other side of the border.

89. On 23 March 1998, eighty Iraqi motor boats, carrying around two hundred and twenty five individuals, were observed patrolling along the Arvand river.

90. On 24 March 1998, at 0920 hours, four Iraqi military personnel were observed constructing one observing post at the GCs of 38S ND 4200005000 on the mpa of Khosravi, in the NML, west of border pillar 53/2.

91. On 24 March 1998, at 1500 hours, Iranian boundary police based at the southern Halala sentry post observed twenty five Iraqi military personnel, equipped with Klashnikovs, RPG7 rifles and wireless devices, inside Iraqi territory, border pillar 35/9, around the GCs of 38S NC 8500021200 on hte map of southern Halala in NML.

92. On 24 March 1998, sixty Iraqi motor boats, carrying around one hundred and thirty individuals, were observed patrolling along the Arvand river.

93. On 25 March 1998, ninety Iraqi motor boats, carrying around two hundred and twenty individuals, were observed patrolling along the Arvand river.

94. On 26 March 1998, at 1020 hours, fifteen Iraqi military personnel with fifteen horses were deployed around the GCs of 38S ND 6200034000 on the map of Ghasr-Shirin, west of border pillar 60/9 and the GCs of 38S ND 6600028000 on the map of Ghasr-e-Shirin, in the NML, west of border pillar 60/5.

95. On 27 March 1998, at 1000 hours, one Iraqi loader was observed restoring canals of the Kangeer river, for three hours and half, at the GCs of 38S NC 5500039000 on the map of Sumar, west of border pillar 40/5.

96. On 27 March 1998, at 1100 hours, Iraqi military personnel with one patrol vehicle, one jeep and one communication truck were observed installing communication pillar at the GCs of 38S NC 7370017800 on the map of Halala, south of border pillar 35/19.

97. On 27 March 1998, at 1830 hours, one Iraqi patrol vehicle entered the Garmisha sentry post and left it after having dropped the individuals aboard.

98. On 27 March 1998, at various hours, altogether seventy five Iraqi motor boats, carrying around one hundred and seventy individuals, were observed patrolling along the Arvand river.

99. On 28 March 1998, at various hours, altogether two hundred and seventy eight Iraqi motor boats, carrying around four hundred and fourteen individuals, were observed patrolling along the Arvand river.

100. On 29 March 1998, altogether seventy seven Iraqi motor boats, carrying around one hundred and eighty individuals, were observed patrolling along the Arvand river.

101. On 30 March 1998, at 0930 hours, two Iraqi mechanical shovels were observed digging canals at the GCs of 38S NC 3900001000 on the map of Khosravi, on the other side of border.

102. On 30 March 1998, altogether eighty nine Iraqi motor boats, carrying around one hundred and ninety five individuals, were observed patrolling along the Arvand river.

103. On 1 April 1998, at 2000 hours, one Iranian civilian, while pasturing sheep in the Naft-Shahr area, was wounded as a result of shooting by Iraqi observing personnel and taken to hospital.

104. On 1 April 1998, at 2400 hours, the Iranian boundary police fired on three MKO terrorist elements who had infiltrated across the border into Iranian territory at the GCs of 39R TP 1900004000 on the map of Nim-Eistgah-Navad, west of border pillar 7/15. As a result, the infiltrators fled back into Iraqi territory.

105. On 1 April 1998, the Iranian boundary police present around the Shahid Bakeri and Taaleea sentry post intercepted a number of Iraqi smugglers. As a result, they fled back and upon inspection of the area a quantity of alcoholic beverage was discovered and confiscated.

106. On 2 April 1998, seventy one Iraqi motor boats, carrying around one hundred and ten individuals, were observed patrolling along the Arvand river.

107. On 3 April 1998, twelve Iraqi motor boats, carrying around thirty seven individuals, were observed patrolling along the Arvand river.

108. On 4 April 1998, altogether eighty four Iraqi motor boats, carrying around one hundred and sixty individuals, were observed patrolling along the Arvand river.

109. On 5 April 1998, at various hours, altogether sixty seven Iraqi motor boats, carrying around one hundred and sixty individuals, were observed patrolling along the Arvand river.

110. On 6 April 1998, at 1020 hours, Iraqi forces installed one binocular around the GCs of 39R TP 1450078500 on the map of Nim-Eistgah-Navad, in the NML, west of border pillar 5.

111. On 6 April 1998, at 1030 hours, one Iraqi ifa vehicle, carrying eight military personnel, stopped in front of the Iraqi Shalamcha sentry post, in side Iraqi territory, and the personnel took a big box and a tripod out of it and carried them into a concrete cabin. It seems that the said box contained a night vision binocular to be used for monitoring border movements.

112. On 6 April 1998, at 1430 hours, one Iraqi tractor and one loader, having aboard five individuals, were observed operating around the GCs of 38S NC 7100020000 on the map of Halala, in the NML, south of border pillars 37 and west of the Talkhab river.

113. On 6 April 1998, eighty Iraqi motor boats, carrying around two hundred and five individuals, were observed patrolling along the Arvand river.

114. On 7 April 1998, at 0710 hours, one Iraqi mechanical shovel and two trucks along with six individuals were observed restoring canals in the border area opposite Sumar.

115. On 7 April 1998, at 0955 hours, one Iraqi mechanical shovel and two trucks were observed operating at the GCs of 39R TP 5200026000 on the map of Khosro-Abad, in the NML, north of Maamir river, south of the Othman river and opposite the area between the Seid Ussof river and Seid Shahab river.

116. On 7 April 1998, at 1135 hours, two catch-ups and one Toyota vehicle, carrying eighteen individuals and equipped with Doshka rifle, belonging to the Iraqi forces were observed moving around the GCs of 38S NC 5420024500 on the map of Ghasr-e-Shirin, in the NML, east of Ahmadabad and Pirooz Khan of Iraq.

117. On 7 April 1998, at various hours, altogether seventy six Iraqi motor boats, carrying around two hundred and eleven individuals, were observed patrolling along the Arvand river.

118. On 8 April 1998, at 1030 hours, two vehicles belonging to the Iraqi forces were observed moving around the GCs of 38S NB 9000098000 on the map of Anjeera.

119. On 8 April 1998, one hundred and twenty two Iraqi motor boats, carrying around two hundred and seventy five individuals, were observed patrolling along the Arvand river.

120. On 9 April 1998, at 0810 to 1845 hours, twenty two Iraqi various vehicles were observed moving in the area opposite Sumar, Naft-Shahr, Khosravi and Ghasr-e-Shirin.

121. On 9 April 1998, at 1310 hours, five Iraqi vehicles carrying a number of individuals were observed at the zero-border point for visiting the Khosravi customs.

122. On 11 April 1998, at 1700 hours, one white Toyota, carrying five individuals, left the GCs of 38S NC 4200065000 on the map of Naft-Shahr, and stopped at the GCs of 38S NC 4300065000 on the map of Naft-Shahr in the NML, south of Chalaee, where is dropped two individuals, and left the area.

123. On 11 April 1998, at various hours, thirty six Iraqi motor boats, carrying one hundred and eight individuals, were observed patrolling in the Arvand river.

124. On 12 April. 1998, eight five Iraqi motor boats, carrying two hundred and ten individuals, were observed patrolling in the Arvand river.

125. On 13 April 1998, at 0900 hours, one truck and one crane belonging to the Iraqi military forces were observed repairing the bridge over the Kankagoosh around the GCs of 38S NC 3500056000 on the map of south of Naft-Shahr, west of border pillar 45.

126. On 14 April 1998, seventy five Iraqi motor boats, carrying one hundred and twenty individuals, were observed patrolling in the Arvand river.

127. On 15 April 1998, from 0800 to 1630 hours, five Iraqi military personnel were observed being engaged in observing activities at the GCs of 38S NC 829000193000 on the map of Halala, on the Shohada hill located on the Meimak heights, in the NML, south of border pillar 35/8.

128. On 17 April 1998, at 1620 hours, sound of tremendous explosions occurred in the ara opposite Hoor Al-Hoveiza, inside Iraqi territory, was heard.

129. On 17 April 1998, eighty five Iraqi motor boats, carrying one hundred and eighty five individuals, were observed patrolling in the Arvand river.

130. On 17 April 1998, Iraqi forces installed a communication tower around the GCs of 38S NB 9700065000 on the map of south of Mehran, in the NML, between northwest of border pillar 30/1 and southwest of border pillars 31.

131. On 18 April 1998, at 2300 hours, six shots were fired with Kalashnikov assault rifle in direction of Iranian territory from inside Iraqi territory.

132. On 18 April 1998, fifteen Iraqi motor boats, carrying one hundred and thirty five individuals, were observed patrolling in the Arvand river.

133. On 19 April 1998, one hundred Iraqi motor boats, carrying two hundred and thirty individuals, were observed patrolling in the Arvand river.

134. On 19 April 1998, two Iraqi loaders and three trucks were observed operating at the GCs of 38S QV 5500096000 on the map of Hoor Al-Hoveiza.

135. On 20 April 1998, one hundred and ten Iraqi motor boats, carrying one hundred and seventy individuals, were observed patrolling in the Arvand river.

136. On 20 April 1998, one Iraqi loader was observed operating at the GCs of 38S TP 5500020000 on the map of Faw, in the NML, on the other side of border.

137. On 21 April 1998, eighty five Iraqi motor boats, carrying around two hundred and two individuals, were observed patrolling in the Arvand river.

138. On 22 April 1998, at 1740 hours, four Iraqi military personnel were observed visiting the Iraqi sentry post located at the GCs of 38S NC 8300019000 on the map of Halala, in the NML, west of border pillar 35/8.

139. On 22 April 1998, at various hours, ninety Iraqi motor boats, twenty launches and two tug boats, carrying around two hundred and forty individuals were observed patrolling in the Arvand river.

140. On 23 April 1998, at 0930 hours, five Iraqi trucks and two bulldozers were observed operating around the GCs of 38R QV 5500049000 on the map of west of Jofeir (2), in the NML, between north and south of border pillars 14/A4 and 14/A5.

141. On 23 April 1998, at 1100 hours, one crane belonging to the Iraqi military forces was observed operating around the GCs of 39R TP 55000020000 on the map of Faw, in the NML.

142. On 24 April 1998, twenty three Iraqi vessels, carrying around one hundred and forty individuals, were observed patrolling in the Arvand river.

143. On 25 April 1998, at 1100 hours, one vehicle belonging to the Iraqi military forces and carrying one cannon and eight individuals was observed at the GCs of 39R TP 2900061000 on the map of Khoram-Shahr, in the NML, opposite the Iranian Minoo island, moving towards the town of Faw.

144. On 25 April 1998, eighty Iraqi vessels, carrying around one hundred and seventy individuals, were observed patrolling in the river.

145. On 26 April 1998, one mechanical shovel, one truck and one loader belonging to the Iraqi military forces were observed being engaged in engineering activities at the GCs of 38R QV 5400076000 on the map of Jonoob Hoor Al-Hovaiza, in the NML, border pillar 14B.

146. On 26 April 1998, eighty Iraqi vessels, carrying around two hundred individuals, were observed patrolling in the Arvand river.

147. On 26 April 1998, one truck and one crane belonging to the Iraqi military forces were observed operating at the GCs of 38S TP 5500020000 on the map of Faw, in the NML.

148. On 27 April 1998, sixty two Iraqi vessels, carrying around two hundred individuals, were observed patrolling in the Arvand river.

149. On 28 April 1998, at 1530 hours, one Iraqi grader was observed operating at the GCs of 38R TP 5100029000 on the map of Khosro-Abad in the NML.

150. On 28 April 1998, sixty Iraqi vessels, carrying around one hundred and seventy five individuals, were observed patrolling in the Arvand river.

151. On 29 April 1998, at 1410 hours, three Iraqi military personnel were observed being engaged in observing activities at the GCs of 38S NC 8300009700 on the map of Halala, in the NML, north of border pillar 35/1.

152. On 29 April 1998, one mechanical shovel and one bulldozer belonging to the Iraqi military forces were observed operating at the GCs of 39R QV 5500069000 on the map of Jonoob Hoor Al-Hovaiza, in the NML, border pillar 14B.

153. On 29 April 1998, one hundred and twenty five Iraqi vessels, carrying around two hundred and ten individuals, were observed patrolling in the Arvand river.

154. On 30 April 1998, at 0200 hours, one Iraqi red Fiat collected, in six times, thirty military personnel in khaki clothes starting from Nissan towards the Iraqi Garmisha sentry post.

155. On 30 April 1998, sixty five Iraqi vessels, carrying around one hundred and ten individuals, were observed patrolling in the Arvand river.

156. On 1 May 1998, at 1030 hours, seven Iraqi trucks and two loaders were observed excavating around the GCs of 38R QV 5500049000 on the map of west of Jofeir (2), in the NML, between north and south of border pillars 14/A4 and 14/A5.

157. On 1 May 1998, a number of anti-revolutionary elements who had infiltrated across the international border into territory of the Islamic Republic of Iran, from the other side of border, were observed moving in the Oshnavia area at the GCs of 38S NF 1200080000 on the map of Soofian and extorting the locals.

158. On 1 May 1998, altogether one hundred and thirty five Iraqi boats, two tug boats and two tankers, carrying around two hundred and forty individuals, were observed patrolling in the Arvand river.

159. On 1 May 1998, one Iraqi loader, one truck and one crane were observed operating in the Faw area.

160. On 2 May 1998, at 0915 hours, two Iraqi patrol vehicles khaki in color, having on board six individuals in green and khaki combat fatigues, out of them three were armed, arrived at the Al-Meghdad sentry post from the town of Khaneghein and returned to that town, at 1030 hours on the same day.

161. On 2 May 1998, at 1200 hours, one Iraqi mechanical shovel was observed constructing strongholds at the GCs of 38R QV 55000049000 on the map of west of Jofeir (2), in the NML, north of border pillar 14/A4 and south of border pillar 14/A5.

162. On 2 May 1998, at 1530 hours, Iraqi forces installed a pair of binoculars at the observing tower of the Iraqi Mondaria sentry post at the GCs of 38S ND 4200005000 on the map of Khosravi, in the NML, and adjacent to border pillar 53/2.

163. On 2 May 1998, sixty five Iraqi motor boats, carrying around one hundred and forty five individuals, were observed patrolling in the Arvand river.

164. On 2 May 1998, five Iraqis who intended to infiltrate across the border into Iranian territory in the Bamoori-Koochak border area were intercepted by the Iranian boundary police based in the area. Upon ignoring the halt order, the Iranian boundary police fired in their direction. The intruders fled back into Iraqi territory.

165. On 3 May 1998, at 0950 hours, one Iraqi Toyotacarrying a number of Iraqi forces visited the border customs post of Mondaria located in the area opposite Khosravi.

166. On 3 May 1998, seventy two Iraqi motor boats carrying around one hundred and ninety five individuals, were observed patrolling in the Arvand river.

167. On 4 May 1998, at 1010 hours, three vehicles belonging to the Iraqi forces were observed moving from the GCs of 38S NC 8800080000 on the map of Anjira towards the GCs of 38S NC 8800098000 on the map of Anjira.

168. On 4 May 1998, at 1900 hours, five individuals aboard one patrol vehicle, all armed with Klashnikovs, were observed in the Mehran area across from the Zarbatia sentry post.

169. On 4 May 1998, Iraqi forces deployed one tank at the GCs of 38S ND 2700098000 on the map of Khosro-Abad, on the other side of the border.

170. On 4 May 1998, four Iraqi heavy vehicles and two loaders were observed operating around the GCs of 38R QV 5500049000 on the map of west of Jofeir (2), in the NML, north of border pillar 14/A4 and south of border pillar 14/A5.

171. On 4 May 1998, one hundred and sixty Iraqi vessels, carrying around two hundred and eighty individuals, were observed patrolling in the Arvand river.

172. On 6 May 1998, at 0935 hours, one Iraqi Toyota vehicle, carrying six military personnel was observed patrolling for one hour around the GCs of 38S NC 5000036000 on the map of Soomar to the GCs of 38S NC 5400041000 on the same map, west of border pillar 43.

173. On 6 May 1998, three Iraqi boats, carrying eight individuals and some luggage, were observed stopping around the GCs of the 39R QA 6700010000 on the map of Saeedia, in the NML.

174. On 7 May 1998, at 1000 hours, one Iraqi vehicle dropped ten military personnel at the GCs of 38S PB 0900072000 on the map of Mehran, and left the area.

175. On 8 May 1998, at 0030 hours, two Iraqi military personnel were observed being engaged in observing activities on the Feiz hill located at the GCs of 38S NC 8700017000 on the map of Halala, in the NML, between northwest and southeast of border pillars 35/1 and 35/6, on the Meimak heights.

176. On 8 May 1998, at 1920 hours, fire (accompanied with explosion and shooting) was observed and heard in the border area opposite Abadan and Hoor Al-Hoveiza.

177. On 8 May 1998, the Iraqi forces embarked on changing guards at the border sentry posts located at the GCs of 38S NC 4100099000 and the GCs of 38S ND 4000012000 and the GCs of 38S ND 3900012000 on the map of Khosravi, in the NML and west of border pillar 56/1.

178. On 9 May 1998, sixty six Iraqi vessels, carrying around two hundred and twenty individuals, were observed patrolling in the Arvand river.

179. On 10 May, 1998, eighty Iraqi motor boats, carrying around two hundred and thirty individuals, were observed patrolling in the Arvand river.

180. On 11 May 1998, at 0150 hours, one Iraqi vehicle carrying five individuals, left the GCs of 38S PB 1500047000 on the map of south of Mehran for the GCs of 38S PB 2400046000 on the map of Kooh-toonel where it dropped those aboard and left the area.

181. On 12 May 1998, at 0240 hours, one Iraqi mechanical shovel was observed operating at the GCs of 38R TP 5200029000 on the map of Khosro-Abad, in the NML.

182. On 12 May 1998, nine Iraqi civilians were observed gathering iron scraps around the GCs of 39R TE 1500017000 on the map of Hosseinia, in the NML, between north and southwest of border pillars 7/23 and 7/24.

183. On 12 and 13 May 1998, one Toyota vehicle carrying four individuals in khaki clothes and equipped with military equipments were observed engaged in reconnaissance activities in the

border area opposite the Bahram-Abad sentry post of Mehran. Upon completing their activities, they returned to Iraqi territory.

184. On 13 May 1998, at 1100 hours, five trucks and one bulldozer belonging to the Iraqi military forces were observed operating at the GCs of 38R QV 5500063000 on the map of Jonoob Hoor Al-Hovaiza, in the NML, border pillar 14/A6.

185. On 13 May 1998, at 1130 hours, Iraqi forces installed two group tents at the GCs of 38R QV 5500072000 on the map of Jonoob Hoor Al-Hovaiza, in the NML, between north and southwest of border pillars 14/A7 and 14B.

186. On 13 May 1998, one hundred and fifty one Iraqi vessels, carrying around three hundred and fifty four individuals, were observed patrolling in the Arvand river.

187. On 14 May 1998, at 0300 hours, the Iranian boundary police based at the Tang-Hammam sentry post, Ghasr-e-Shirin area, intercepted a number of Iraqi armed smugglers who had infiltrated across the border into Iranian territory. As a result of heavy firing by the Iranian guards, they fled back into Iraqi territory.

188. On 14 May 1998, one mechanical shovel and a number of trucks belonging to the Iraqi military forces were observed operating at the GCs of 38R TP 5200028000 on the map of Khosro-Abad, in the NML.

189. On 15 May 1998, at 1130 hours, seven Iraqi Toyota vehicles carrying three soldiers and ten individuals in civil clothing entered the town of Mondaria via the Halvan intersection (opposite the Khosravi border area). They left after visiting the area.

190. On 15 May 1998, seventy one Iraqi vessels, carrying around two hundred and twenty individuals, were observed patrolling in the Arvand river.

191. On 16 May 1998, at 0645 hours, one minibus carrying fifteen individuals and twenty Iraqi Toyota patrols were observed moving at the GCs of 38S ND 6200025000 and the GCs of 38S ND 5300025000 on the map of Ghasr-e-Shirin.

192. On 16 May 1998, seventy one Iraqi vessels, carrying around one hundred and forty one individuals, were observed patrolling in the Arvand river.

193. On 17 May 1998, at 1245 hours, two heavy vehicles belonging to the Iraqi military forces, and, at 1910 hours, on the same day four other Iraqi vehicles carrying forty to fifty individuals moved from the Atahrir sentry post towards the Arashid sentry post. The individuals aboard two white patrol vehicles with red strip on their sides were supervising the troop replacement.

194. On 17 May 1998, ninety four Iraqi vessels, carrying around one hundred and twenty four individuals, were observed patrolling in the Arvand river.

195. On 18 May 1998, at 0600 hours, ten civilians aboard two white land cruise vehicles embarked on setting an ambush around two hundred meters north of the Iraqi Hamad-Shahab sentry post located at the GCs of 38S QA 0640093600 on the map of the Mayma river inside of the Iranian territory, in the NML, south of border pillar 23. AT 0500 hours on the following day, they left the area towards the Iraqi Tayab sentry post. The said individuals were belonging to the anti-revolutionary group and were engaged in the reconnaissance activities.

196. On 18 May 1998, at 1830 hours, one Iraqi vehicle carrying four armed individuals were observed around the GCs of 38S ND 6600028000 on the map of Ghasr-e-Shirin, in the NML, west of border pillar 60/5.

197. On 18 May 1998, one truck belonging to the Iraqi military forces carried the belonging of the Iraqi sentry post located at the GCs of 38S QA 4800050000 on the map of Yabiss to the Iraqi Arrashid sentry post located at the GCs of 38S QA 5700035000 on the map of north of Hoor Al-Hoveiza, in the NML, south of the border pillar 21/3 and west of border pillar 22.

198. On 19 May 1998, at 0810 hours, six Iraqi civilians riding three motorcycles were observed patrolling and observing at the GCs of 39R TP 1500096000 on the map of Nim-Eistgah-Navad, in the NML, between north and south of border pillars 7/9 and 7/10.

199. On 19 May 1998, at 1030 hours, four trucks and one roller belonging to the Iraqi military forces were observed operating at the GCs of 39R QV 5500063000 on the map of Jonoob Hoor Al-Hovaiza, in the NML, south of border pillar 14/A6.

200. On 19 May 1998, ninety eight Iraqi vessels, carrying around one hundred and forty five individuals, were observed patrolling and fishing in the Arvand river.

201. On 20 May 1998, at 0947 hours, one Iraqi loader belonging to the Iraqi forces was observed operating around the GCs of 38R QA 5500004000 on the map of Hoor-Al-Hoveiza.

202. On 20 May 1998, one hundred ten Iraqi vessels, carrying around one hundred and seventy five individuals, were observed patrolling the Arvand river.

203. On 21 May 1998, ninety two Iraqi vessels, carrying around one hundred and five individuals, were observed patrolling in the Arvand river.

204. On 22 May 1998, at 1020 hours, three Iraqi vehicles carrying about sixty individuals were observed moving around the GCs of 38S NC 4000066000 and the GCs of 38S NC 3500056000 on the map of Naft-Shahr south of the border pillar 45.

205. On 22 May 1998, seventy one Iraqi motor boats carrying around one hundred and ninety individuals were observed patrolling in the Arvand river.

206. On 23 May 1998, seventy one Iraqi boats and vessels, carrying around one hundred and ninety individuals, were observed patrolling in the Arvand river.

207. On 24 May 1998, sixty Iraqi vessels, carrying around one hundred and seventy individuals were observed patrolling in the Arvand river.

208. On 25 May 1998, at 1100 hours, five Iraqi vehicles, carrying fifteen military personnel, were observed moving between the GCs of 38S ND 5100027000 on the map of Ghasr-e-Shirin, in the NML, north of Majid-Salar, west of the Hedayat sentry post, and the GCs of 38S ND 5400025000 on the map of Ghasr-e-Shirin, north of Pirooz-Khan of Iraq.

209. On 25 May 1998, at 1820 hours, one Iraqi civilian was observed filming the Iranian military positions around the GCs of 39R TP 3900056000 on the map of Abadan.

210. On 26 May 1998, at 1750 hours, the Iraqi military forces moved an anti-aircraft defence cannon from the GCs of 38S NC 5100035000 on the map of Soomar, west of border pillar 40/3 to the GCs of 38S NC 5800038000 on the map of Soomar, in the NML, on the Komah-Sang mountains and south of border pillar 40/5 and installed it.

211. On 26 May 1998, ninety Iraqi motor boats carrying around one hundred and seventy individuals, were observed patrolling in the Arvand river.

212. On 26 May 1998, two Iraqi trailers, three trucks and two pickups belonging to the Iraqi forces carrying about sixty individuals were observed moving around the GCs of 0100093000 on the map of Meima, south of the border pillar 24/2.

213. On 27 May 1998, at 1000 hours, three Iraqi trucks and one grader were observed operating at the GCs of 39R QV 5500063000 on the map of Jonoob Hoor Al-Hovaiza, in the NML, south of border pillar 14/A6.

214. On 27 May 1998, from 1012 to 1110 hours, one Iraqi helicopter was observed flying towards the town of Badra and patrolling around the Sadr-Arafat sentry post at the GCs of 38S NB 9700065000 on the map of Mehran, In the NML, west of border pillar 31.

215. On 27 May 1998, at 1210 hours, a mechanical shovel belonging to the Iraqi military forces was observed excavating at the GCs of 39R TP 5200028000 on the map of Khosro-Abad, in the NML.

216. On 27 May 1998, sound of two explosions occurred around the Iraqi Fakka sentry post located at the GCs of 38S QA 4100048000 on the map of Yabiss, on the other side of border, was heard.

217. On 27 May 1998, seventy five Iraqi motor boats carrying around one hundred and ninety five individuals, were observed patrolling in the Arvand river.

218. On 28 May 1998, at 0700 hours, Iraqi troops based at the observing post located opposite the Mian-Tang sentry post, in the Soomar area, were observed walking.

219. On 28 May 1998, at 1215 hours, one Iraqi vehicle carrying thirty armed military personnel entered the Iraqi Abziady sentry post.

220. On 28 May 1998, at 1430 hours, the Iraqi forces were observed removing three machine-guns from the Garmisha sentry post and loading stuff in nine trucks and passengers cars from the ammunition depot.

221. On 28 May 1998, seventy eight Iraqi motor boats carrying around one hundred and ninety five individuals, were observed patrolling in the Arvand river.

222. On 29 May 1998, at 1900 hours, Iraqi forces installed a 14 mm [14/5mm cannon at north of their sentry post located at the GCs of 38S PB 0600054000 on the map of Mehran, in the NML, south of border pillar 28/1.

223. On 29 May 1998, ninety Iraqi vessels, carrying around one hundred and twenty six individuals, were observed patrolling in the Arvand river.

224. On 30 May 1998, eighty three Iraqi motor boats carrying around one hundred and sixty individuals, were observed patrolling and fishing in the Arvand river.

225. On 31 May 1998, at 0830 hours, one Iraqi military helicopter and one another bearing UN mark landed at the Iraqi town of Mondaria at the GCs of 38S ND 4240004300 and the GCs of 38S ND 4290004800 on the map of Khosravi, in the NML, south of border pillar 53/2. The individuals aboard got off the helicopters and visited the border points and the public health department of town. They left the area at 1020 hours on the same day.

226. On 31 May 1998, at 1030 hours, two Iraqi helicopters were observed being engaged in aerial reconnaissance activities for five minutes at the GCs of 38S NC 4200064000 on the map of Naft-Shahr, in the NML, south of Chalaee, west of the Kana-Kabood border river.

227. On 1 June 1998, at 0200 hours, the Iranian boundary police intercepted a number of Iraqi smugglers who had infiltrated across the border into Iranian territory at the GCs of 38S ND 6800028000 on the map of Ghasr-e-Shirin, in the NML, south of Boshkan, east of border pillars 60/4 and 60/5. As a result, the infiltrators fled back into Iraqi territory leaving behind a quantity of alcoholic beverage.

228. On 1 June 1998, at 0800 hours, drivers of two Iraqi vehicles embarked on displacing troops on the margin of the Shalamcha border strip. Most displacements were carried out during night and force reinforcement at the border posts was noticed.

229. On 1 June 1998, at 1530 hours, seven Iraqi vehicles carrying two anti-aircraft defence cannons and about forty individuals were observed moving at the GCs of 38S PB 1200047000 on the map of south of Mehran, in the NML, south of border pillars 27/9-27/10.

230. On 1 June 1998, the Iranian boundary police ambushed a number of Iraqi civilians who intended to infiltrate across the border into Iranian territory at the GCs of 39R TP 1400079000 on the map of Nim-Eistgah-Navad, in the NML, west of border pillar 5/2 and west of border pillar 7/13 and the GCs of 39R TQ 1500001000 on the map of NimEistgah-Navad. As a result, one of the intruders was wounded and the rest managed to escape.

231. On 2 June 1998, one hundred three Iraqi vessels, carrying around two hundred and twenty five individuals, were observed patrolling in the Arvand river.

232. On 3 June 1998, at 0530 hours, the Iranian boundary police ambushed four Iraqi armed smugglers who had infiltrated across the border into Iranian territory at the GCs of 38S ND 5200016000 on the map of Kharatiha, five km east of border pillar 57/7. As a result, the infiltrators managed to escape and a quantity of illegal goods was discovered in the area.

233. On 3 June 1998, at 1430 hours, fire at gross in Iraqi territory reached Iranian territory at the GCs of 38S ND 48400017000 on the map Kharatiha, border pillar 37/8. The fire fighters cooperated with the border guards in putting it out.

234. On 3 June 1998, at 2330 hours, the Iranian boundary police ambushed a number of Iraqi smugglers at the GCs of 38S ND 59700023200 on the map of Ghasr-e-Shirin. The smugglers escaped in direction of the Iraqi village of Ali-Mir, leaving behind twenty two backpacks containing beer cans.

235. On 3 June 1998, eighty eight Iraqi vessels, carrying around two hundred individuals, were observed patrolling the Arvand river.

236. On 4 June 1998, at 0700 hours, three Iraqi loader -bull dozers were observed excavating, inside Iraqi territory, opposite the Iranian Minoo sentry post.

237. On 4 June 1998, at 0900 hours, the Iraqi troops, based at the Shalamcha border installed two grinof machine-guns on the roof top of the post. Moreover, at 0945 hours on the same day, ten soldiers were deployed at the posts on the way leading to Shalamcha.

238. On 4 June 1998, at 2330 hours, the Iranian patrolling police intercepted a number of Iraqi smugglers who had infiltrated across the border into Iranian territory at the Tangab valley at the GCs of 38S ND 6600038000 on the map of Ghasr-e-Shirin, southeast border pillar 60/10-60/11. As a result, the infiltrators fled back.

239. On 5 June 1998, at 2245 hours, the Iranian patrolling police intercepted a number of Iraqi smugglers who had infiltrated across the border into Iranian territory at the GCs of 38S ND 6800025000 on the map of Ghasr-e-Shirin, east of border pillar 60/3. As a result, the smugglers fled away.

240. On 5 June 1998, sixty Iraqi vessels, carrying around one hundred and seventy individuals, were observed patrolling in the Arvand river.

241. On 6 June 1998, at 0710 hours, two white vehicles (probably belonging to the anti-revolutionary elements) were observed moving from the GCs of 38S NC 4340097200 on the map of Khosrovi towards the GCs of 38S NC 4350097900 on the map of Khosravi. They left the area after half an hour.

242. On 6 June 1998, at 2115 hours, one Iraqi Toyota pickup equipped with one Dush-K machine gun and three soldiers was observed at the GCs of 39R TP 4400049500 on the map of Abadan.

243. On 6 June 1998, eleven Iraqi vessels, carrying around forty individuals, were observed patrolling in the Arvand river.

244. On 7 June 1998, at 1000 hours, two Iraqi passenger vehicles having aboard six Iraqi military personnel arrived at the Iraqi Chalaee sentry post located at the GCs of 38S NC 4300065000 on the map of Naft-Shahr, in the NML, west of the Kana-Kabood and Chalaee border rivers. They left the area after doing observation activities.

245. On 8 June 1998, at 0905 hours, six Iraqi vehicles belonging to the Iraqi forces carrying twenty nine individuals and equipped with machine-gun were observed moving at the GCs of 8600097000 on the map of Abulakhasib.

246. On 8 June 1998, at 0950 hours, ten Iraqi vehicles out of them three equipped with machine-guns and carrying ninety five individuals, some of them Iraqi senior commanders were observed visiting the Iraqi sentry post, opposite the Iranian posts, using the Darvaza-Shalamcha road. On return, they headed towards the Kilometre Davazdavanin sentry post.

247. On 8 June 1998, Iraqi army reinforced its forces at the Nashva base. Moreover, at 23 km west of the Barzegar sentry post, opposite Hoveiza district, one trailer carrying ammunition as well as fifty military and civilian individuals were seen at the GCs of 38R QV 56000347000 on the map of west of Jofeir (2), in the NML, west of border pillars 14/A1 (Hoor Al-Hoveiza).

248. On 8 June 1998, sixty Iraqi vessels, carrying around one hundred fifty five individuals, were observed patrolling in the Arvand river.

249. On 9 June 1998, at 1030 hours, Iraqi personnel embarked on pitching four tents at the GCs of 38S ND 6100025000, on the map of Ghasr-Shirin, north of Barar-Aziz.

250. On 9 June 1998, at 1150 hours, two Iraqi vehicles carrying eight individuals (probably belonging to the anti-revolutionary elements) were observed moving from the Varmhazar area to Doraji, in the area across from Mehran. They returned at 1330 hours on the same.

251. On 9 June 1998, eighty Iraqi vessels, carrying around one hundred and seventy individuals, were observed patrolling in the Arvand river.

252. On 10 June 1998, at 2040 hours, the Iranian boundary police based at the Dirifarm sentry post intercepted armed individuals aboard three Iraqi motor boats who intended to unload smuggled goods in the reedy lands, inside Iranian territory. As a result, they fled in direction of Iraqi water. Subsequently, on the following day at 0500 hours, the said boats with the same intention entered into area controlled by the southern Minavi post, and upon reaction made by Iranian border guards, they retreated in direction of Iraqi water.

253. On 10 June 1998, sixty Iraqi motor boats carrying around one hundred and thirty individuals, were observed patrolling in the Arvand river.

254. On 11 June 1998, at 0800 hours, the Iraqi forces evacuated their base located around the GCS of 38R QV 5300039000 on the map of west of Jofeir(2), northwest of border pillar 14/A4.

255. On 11 June 1998, at 1720 hours, the Iranian boundary police observed a boat carrying two individuals around the GCs of 38R QV 5100047000 on the map of west of Jofeir (2), west of border pillar 14/A4.

256. On 12 June 1998, at 1700 hours, Iraqi forces installed one anti-aircraft defence cannon at the GCs of 38R QV 5200049000 on the map of west of Jofeir (2), northwest of border pillar 14/A4.

257. On 13 June 1998, at 0900 hours, five people (probably from the anti-revolutionary elements) equipped with individuals equipments were observed across from the Chakma-Ghamar sentry post. They were joined by two other individuals and left the for the Chakma-Moossa sentry post.

258. On 13 June 1998, at 1000 hours, eight Iraqi patrols were observed moving and visiting the area around the GCS of 38 SND 3500003000 and 38S ND 3800003000 on the map of Khosravi, west of border pillars 55, 55/1, and 55/2.

259. On 13 June 1998, sixty Iraqi motor boats carrying around one hundred and thirty individuals, were observed patrolling on the margin of the Arvand river.

260. On 14 June 1998, at 1100 hours, one Iraqi bulldozer was observed erecting an embarkment on the other side of the water border (the Arvand river), 300 m inside Iraqi territory, opposite the Iranian Minoo sentry post.

261. On 15 June 1998, at 0230 hours, two Iraqi vehicles, carrying fifteen individuals as well as a number of sheep were observed moving at the GCs of 38S ND 5100027000 on the map of Ghasr-e-Shirin, in the NML, north of Majid-Salar of Iraq.

262. On 15 June 1998, at 0840 hours, the Iraqi troops installed an antenna on the Height 254 located at the GCs of 38S NC 3800098000 on the map of Khosravi, north of Halvan.

263. On 15 June 1998, at 0840 to 2250 hours, sixteen Iraqi vehicles carrying Iraqi kurds were observed moving around the GCs of 38S NC 5000084000 on the map of Sizda between northwest and southwest of border pillars 46/5 and 46/6 the GCs of 38S NC 7700045000 on the map of Naft-Shahr, west of border pillars 46/2 and 46/3.

264. On 15 June 1998, at 1000 hours, four patrol vehicles, three trucks and one blue passenger car carrying fifty individuals were deployed at the GCs of 38S ND 6440025800 on the map of Ghasr-e-Shirin, west of border pillar 60/3, inside Iraqi territory. They embarked on installing four green group tents and began some activities and search in the village of Majid-Ghadir-Agha.

265. On 15 June 1998, at 1045 hours, one white Iraqi helicopter was observed flying at 250 feet over the ground and patrolling 100 m inside Iraqi territory from northwest of the Shalamcha sentry post. After making a number of rounds, it flew in direction of Iraqi territory at 1110 hours on the same day.

266. On 15 June 1998, at 1100 hours, one helicopter belonging to the Iraqi forces was observed flying from the GCs of 39S TP 1400078000 on the map of Nim-Eistgah-Navad, in the NML, west of border pillars 4/4, 5 and 5/1 towards the GCs of 39R TP 1500075000 on the map of Khoram-Shahr, in the NML, west of border pillar 1/22 along the border zero point.

267. On 15 June 1998, nineteen Iraqi motor boats carrying around sixty seven individuals, were observed patrolling on the margin of the Arvand river.

268. On 15 June 1998, sixty five Iraqis taken to the area aboard nine vehicles were observed installing five tents around the GCs of 38S ND 6000045000 on the map of Ghasr-Shirin, north of border pillar 60/15.

269. On 15 June 1998, Iraqi military personnel fired two illuminators, inside Iraqi territory, in the area opposite Hoor al-Hoveiza area.

270. On 16 June 1998, at 1130 hours, thirty five Iraqi vehicles were observed moving around the Sadr-Arafat sentry post at the GCs of 38S NB 9700065000 on the map of Mehran, in the NML, west of border pillar 31.

271. On 17 June1998 forty five Iraqi vessels carrying around one hundred and ten individuals, were observed patrolling and fishing in the Arvand river.

272. On 18 June 1998, from 0940 to 1040 hours, nine Iraqi military personnel were observed moving and patrolling around the GCs of 38S NC 4000069000 on the map of Naft-Shahr and the GCs of 38S ND 4700097000 on the map of Kharatiha , west of boder pillar 48, on the Zein Al-Kosh (Zein Al-ghoos) Heights.

273. On 18 June 1998, at 1030 hours, five Iraqi vehicles carrying fifteen individuals were observed visiting the Iraqi Mondaria sentry post at the GCs of 38S ND 4200004000 on the map of Khosravi, in the NML, border pillar 53/2.

274. On 18 June 1998, at 2200 hours, the Iranian boundary police clashed with Iraqi armed smugglers at one km east of the Shahid Bakkeri base. As a result six smugglers were killed and the rest managed to escape aboard two boats leaving behind two Kalashnikov assault rifles and eight cartridges.

275. On 18 June 1998, fifty five Iraqi vessels carrying around one hundred and twenty individuals, were observed patrolling in the Arvand river.

276. On 18 June 1998, three Iraqi military personnel were observed patrolling around the Iraqi Chaparzad sentry post. On the same day, at 1845 one, one jeep was seen moving from the Halvan Military police post to the Zein Al-Kosh (Zein Al-ghoos) heights.

277. On 19 June 1998, at 1930 hours, four individuals aboard two motorcycles arrived at the Iraqi Mohammad Ghassem sentry post. After five minutes, they were joined by two passenger cars and together began patrolling in the area.

278. On 19 June 1998, at 1945 hours, one bus dropped thirty two individuals around the GCs of 38S TP 3700058000 of the map of Abadan and unloaded a few white bags and logs. Afterwards, it left towards the city of bassra.

279. On 19 June 1998, movement of anti-revolutionary elements and their vehicles increased in the area of the Chilat sentry post.

280. On 19 June 1998, fifteen Iraqi motor boats carrying around seventy individuals, were observed patrolling in the Arvand river.

281. On 20 June 1998, at 0300 hours, the Iranian boundary police ambushed a number of Iraqi smuggles who had infiltrated across the border into Iranian territory in the Ghasr-e-Shirin area. As a result, the infiltrators managed to escape leaving behind 144 beer cans in the area.

282. On 20 June 1998, at 2030 hours, fifteen individuals aboard two tractors and motorcycle were observed on the foot of Shino valley, inside Iraqi territory.

283. On 20 June 1998, at 2200 hours, one Iraqi aircraft was observed flying around the GCs of 39R TP 2800068000 on the map of Khoram-Shahr, opposite Koot-Sheikh of Iran, on the other side of the border.

284. On 20 June 1998, two Iraqi vehicles were observed moving around the GCs of 38S ND 6200024000 on the map ofGhasr-e-Shirin, in the NML, the village of Majid-Agha, and the GCs of 38S ND 6500027000 on the mapof Ghasr-e-Shirin, west of border pillar 60/4.

285. On 21 June 1998, at 0500 hours, the Iranian boundary police at the area controlled by the Kilometr-Bistopanj sentry post suspected a number of individuals (probably anti-revolutionary elements) and opened fire in their direction. They returned the fire and managed to escape.

286. On 22 June 1998, at 0740 hours, three Iraqi mechanical shovel were observed operating at the GCs of 38R TD 5200058000 on the map of Khoram-Shahr, opposite Minoo island and Arvand-Kenar.

287. On 23 June 1998, at 0700 hours, two patrol vehicles and two Iraqi trucks carrying forty military personnel were observed around the village of Majid-Ghadi-Agha. In the same time, one truck and one loader were observed excavating in the same area.

288. On 23 June 1998, at 0843 hours, one vehicle carrying seven individuals in military uniform, and on the same day, at 0925 hours, another vehicle, carrying four individuals, headed, from inside Iraqi territory, towards the Shalamcha border, and returned after a short stay at the sentry post.

289. On 23 June 1998, at 1000 hours, forty Iraqis divided in groups of five were observed on the margin of the road at the GCs of 38S ND6200024000 to 38S ND 5300024000 on the map of Ghasr-e-Shirin, between the village of Pirooz-Khan through the village of Majid-Ghadir-Agha, in the NML.

290. On 23 June 1998, fifty two Iraqi military personnel taken to the area aboard five vehicles were observed digging the ground around the GCs of 38S ND 6200024000 and 38 ND 5100027000 on the map of Ghasr-e-Shirin, in the NML, the village of Majid-Salar and the village of Majid-Ghadir-Agha, east of the Hedayat sentry post.

291. On 23 June 1998, forty Iraqi motor boats carrying around sixty individuals, were observed patrolling in the Arvand river.

292. On 24 June 1998, at 0730 and 0900 hours, explosions and shooting with Dosh-K and mortars were heard, from inside Iraqi territory, around the GCs of 38R QV 6200055000 and the GCs of 38R QV 6200049000 on the map of west of Jofeir (2), west of border pillars 14/A4 and 14/A5.

293. On 24 June 1998, at 0900 hours, Iraqi troops installed one Dosh-K machine-gun on the roof top of the Ghalaa-Seifi sentry post at the GCs of 38S ND 3900012000 on the map of Khosravi, west of border pillar 56/1.

294. On 24 June 1998, at 0920 hours, one Iraqi loader was observed erecting embarkment on the Faw road at the GCs of 39S TP 2700069000 on the map of Khoram-Shahr, east of Koot-Sheikh, opposite the Karun river and Arvand river intersection.

295. On 24 June 1998, twenty four Iraqi motor boats carrying around one hundred and five individuals, were observed patrolling in the Arvand river.

296. On 25 June 1998, at 1020 and 1300 hours, Iraqi troops installed two doshka machine-guns on the roof top of the Mondaria and Charghad sentry posts located at the GCs of 38S ND 4100005000 on the map of Khosravi, northwest of border pillar 53/2 and the GCs of 38S NC 4700075000 on the map of Sizda, in the NML, southwest of border pillar 49/1.

297. On 25 June 1998, forty eight Iraqi motor boats carrying around one hundred and fifty five individuals, were observed patrolling in the Arvand river.

298. On 26 June 1998, at 1830 hours, the Iraqi troops removed the antenna installed on the Height 254 located at the GCs of 38S ND 3800098000 on the map of Khosravi, north of Halvan, and installed another unidentified antenna on the same place.

299. On 26 June 1998, at 2340 hours, a number of explosions was heard around the GCs of 38R 5800074000 on the map of south of Hoor Al-Hoveiza, west of border pillars 14/A7 and 14/B.

300. On 27 June 1998, twenty two Iraqi motor boats carrying around sixty individuals, were observed patrolling in the Arvand river.

301. On 28 June 1998, at 0830 hours, fifty Iraqis with ten patrol vehicles were observed moving around the GCs of 38S ND 635000255000 on the map of Ghasr-e-Shirin, north of Majid-Ghadir-Agha.

302. On 28 June 1998, one Iraqi vehicle carrying seven individuals left the Halvan Military police post located at the GCs of 38S NC 4340097200 and the GCs of 38S NC 4500099200 and the GCs of 38S NC 4570097800 on the map of Khosravi and headed towards the Halvan intersection, and returned to the Chirzad sentry post. It then left for behind of the Zein Al-Kosh (Zein Al-ghoos) heights.

303. On 29 June 1998, forty six Iraqi motor boats carrying around fifty five individuals, were observed patrolling in the Arvand river.

304. On 1 July 1998, three Iraqi loaders were observed being engaged in engineering activities around Om-Arrassas island in the area opposite Khoram-Shahr.

305. On 1 July 1998, fifty Iraqi motor boats carrying around one hundred and thirty individuals, were observed patrolling in the Arvand river.

306. On 2 July 1998, thirty one Iraqi military personnel were observed patrolling at the GCs of 38S NC 5000088000 on the map of Sizda, west of border pillar and the GCs of 38S NC 5200093000 on the map of Kharatiha, west of border pillar 46/13 and the GCs of 38S ND 4300005000 on the map of Khosravi, in the NML, border pillar 53/2.

307. On 3 July 1998, fifty one Iraqi motor boats carrying around eighty individuals, were observed patrolling in the Arvand river.

UNITED
NATIONS

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General Assembly
Security Council

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A/53/1035
S/1999/878
12 August 1999

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Fifty-third session
Agenda item 155
MEASURES TO ELIMINATE INTERNATIONAL
TERRORISM

SECURITY COUNCIL
Fifty-fourth year

Letter dated 12 August 1999 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I would like to refer to the letter to you dated 2 August 1999 (A/53/1031-S/1999/839) from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon. In recent months, an increasing number of roadside bombs have been placed along the main axes of movement in the central sectors of the security zone in south Lebanon. Most recently, on 22 July 1999, such a bomb was placed and directed against a bus carrying Israeli soldiers near Moshav Shtula, inside northern Israel, along the security fence that follows the international border.

After this incident, Israel Defense Forces units in the security zone stopped and questioned a number of residents of the nearby Lebanese villages of Ayta and Bint Jubayl. This led to the discovery of large stores of weaponry, including unprecedented quantities of roadside bombs for use by the terrorist organization Hizbullah. It must be stressed that such vast quantities of munitions held in these villages had been used repeatedly against Israeli soldiers as well as against local civilians.

The use by the Hizbullah of Lebanese villages and population centres as launching points and staging areas for terror operations is yet a further violation of the April 1996 understandings reached by former United States Secretary of State Warren Christopher. The support and encouragement given by the Government of Lebanon, as voiced in the letter of the Permanent Representative of Lebanon serves only to add to the above-mentioned violation.

In this context, the allegation made by the Permanent Representative of Lebanon in his letter, that Israel has been holding the people of Ayta "under siege" is baseless. Movement by residents of the village is unrestricted both within the security zone and outside. The claim by the Permanent Representative regarding restrictions on movement by people with severe illnesses is similarly

without foundation. Food supplies and medicines, as well as other goods, are regularly supplied to Ayta, without interruption.

Clearly, Israel has no interest in maintaining its security zone, or in having to search for weapons in such places as Ayta or Bint Jubayl. Israel would, by far, prefer the prevention and avoidance of acts of terror on and from Lebanese territory, through the full implementation of Security Council resolution 425 (1978), which not only calls for the withdrawal of Israeli forces, but also requires the restoration of international peace and security and the return of the effective authority of the Lebanese Government in the area.

Lebanon's refusal to accept Israel's offer to implement the resolution regrettably and often tragically perpetuates the volatile situation in southern Lebanon. The Government of Lebanon is solely responsible for this situation.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter circulated as a document of the fifty-third session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 155, entitled "Measures to eliminate international terrorism", and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Dore GOLD
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

UNITED NATIONS **A S**

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

A/53/1037
S/1999/879
13 August 1999

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Fifty-third session
Agenda item 62
QUESTION OF CYPRUS

SECURITY COUNCIL
Fifty-fourth year

Letter dated 12 August 1999 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith a letter dated 11 August 1999, addressed to you by His Excellency Mr. Aytuğ Plûmer, Representative of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (see annex).

I should be grateful if the text of the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 62, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Engin SOYSAL
Counsellor
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

Annex

Letter dated 11 August 1999 from Mr. Aytuğ Plümer
to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to refer to the letters dated 30 June and 29 July 1999 (A/53/1007-S/1999/744 and A/53/1030-S/1999/835, respectively) addressed to you by Greek Cypriot representatives at the United Nations, which contain allegations regarding "violations of the airspace of the Republic".

It will be recalled that similar unfounded charges of so-called "airspace violations" were rejected in toto in our previous communications addressed to you, most recently in my letter dated 30 June 1999 (A/53/1008-S/1999/745). I would like to emphasize, once again, that flights within the sovereign airspace and flight information region of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus take place with the full knowledge and consent of the relevant authorities of the State over which the Greek Cypriot regime in the South has no jurisdiction or right of say whatsoever.

While directing such unfounded accusations against the Turkish Cypriot side, the Greek Cypriot side is blatantly continuing with its heavy militarization campaign in South Cyprus. The Greek Cypriot daily Cyprus Mail of 6 August 1999 has reported that South Cyprus is to receive six TOR-M1 missile systems from Greece as part of the exchange for Russian S-300 missiles now deployed in Crete. Reportedly, the Greek Cypriot National Guard will receive the first batch of 21 such missile systems once they have been delivered to Greece from Russia. According to the Greek Cypriot daily Politis dated 7 August 1999 the TOR-M1 missile systems will be displayed at the military parade to be held on 1 October.

The Greek Cypriot armaments programme for the period 1997-2001, according to Greek Cypriot weekly Periodiko, includes the following:

41	tanks
12	155 mm mobile artillery
7	35 mm anti-aircraft guns
12	Aspide systems
2	Mistral-Atlas missiles
3	destroyers
2	Shaldag patrol vessels
3	MM-40 Exocet Block 2 shore missile systems
20-32	aircraft
4-6	helicopters
12	S-300 RM41 missile systems

I would like to emphasize that the continuing militarization campaign by the Greek Cypriot side, as well as the hostile and restrictive policies directed against the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, constitute the underlying causes of tension in Cyprus. My Government expects that the Greek Cypriot side will be urged by the international community to abandon its anachronistic policies against the Turkish Cypriot people and to stop the arming campaign, which exacerbate tension and hinder progress towards reconciliation between the two States.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 62, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Aytuğ Plümer
Representative
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1999/880
16 August 1999
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

IDENTICAL LETTERS DATED 15 AUGUST 1999 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a letter dated 14 August 1999 from Mr. Mohammed Said Al-Sahaf, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq, concerning a further act of aggression committed on 10 August 1999 by the United States and the United Kingdom against Iraqi civilian installations, in which United States and British aircraft bombed grain storage facilities in Muthanna Governorate in the south of Iraq, damaging the facilities and the grain stored in them. The Minister requests the Secretary-General and the Security Council to intervene with the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom to induce them to desist from the acts of aggression that they are perpetrating against Iraq.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Saeed H. HASAN
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex

Identical letters dated 14 August 1999 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq addressed to the Secretary-General and to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to inform you that, at 1930 hours on 10 August 1999, United States and British aircraft made a further attack on Iraq, bombing the grain storage facilities in Muthanna Governorate in the south of the country and causing the following damage:

1. Damage to quantities of rice inside the facility;

2. Damage to the walls and roofs of several facilities;

3. Shattering windows;

4. Damage to the false roofs of the facilities.

The area that was the target of the latest attack contained no military objective; there was nothing there but storage facilities for the staple food of the Iraqi people. These criminal acts perpetrated by two permanent members of the Security Council against Iraqi civilian targets and installations are totally at variance with the Charter of the United Nations and the rules of international law and are a blatant violation of the sovereignty of an independent State Member of the United Nations and a shameless breach of all international treaties. Accordingly, we request you to condemn this barbarous aggression and to intervene with the United States and the United Kingdom to induce them to cease, and not to repeat, these acts, which have become an established policy of the two States concerned as a means of attaining their political objectives, which are to damage Iraq and its independence and to cause injury to the steadfast Iraqi people.

These hostile acts demonstrate once again the falsity of the bragging claim by the United States Administration and the United Kingdom Government that they are anxious to alleviate the suffering of the Iraqi people, which is caused by their own insistence on continuing to impose the unjust embargo on them. Such acts also demonstrate the untruthfulness of their allegations that their attacking aircraft, in violating the sovereignty of Iraq's national airspace, are only targeting military sites and installations.

In condemning these repeated hostile criminal acts against our country, we request the Security Council to intervene with the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom to induce them to desist from the acts of aggression which they are perpetrating against Iraq, to put an end to them and not to repeat them. The Government of the Republic of Iraq regards all the States - whether those whose aircraft carry out these criminal acts or those from whose territory the aircraft take off, namely Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Turkey - as being fully responsible for these hostile actions, for the damage which they have caused and are causing and for the material and moral damage which they have inflicted and are inflicting on the Republic of Iraq.

We also take this opportunity to affirm the legally established right of the Republic of Iraq to seek compensation for all the material and moral damage inflicted on Iraq by the perpetration of these hostile actions, which are incompatible with the Charter of the United Nations and with the provisions of international law.

(Signed) Mohammed Said AL-SAHAF
Minister for Foreign Affairs
of the Republic of Iraq

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1999/881
16 August 1999
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: FRENCH

LETTER DATED 16 AUGUST 1999 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to express to you our strongest indignation at the actions committed by the Rwandan and Ugandan aggressor troops in Kisangani, capital of the eastern province, during the past two weeks.

My Government is dismayed that forces foreign to the Democratic Republic of the Congo are fighting a pitched battle with heavy weapons in Kisangani, a city of over 1 million inhabitants, with complete impunity and in full view of the international community.

My Government reminds the Security Council that it designated Rwanda and Uganda as the aggressor countries from the onset of the Congolese question on 2 August 1998. The unfortunate events now unfolding in Kisangani are further tangible proof of the armed aggression against the Democratic Republic of the Congo by this Rwandan-Ugandan coalition.

By means of this letter, my Government wishes to bring this matter before the Security Council and to request that august United Nations body to meet urgently in order to:

1. Take note of and condemn the serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law which the armed forces of the Rwandan-Ugandan coalition are committing against the innocent citizens of Kisangani;

2. Take note of and condemn the interruption, as a result of this fighting, of the national immunization days, which were to have enabled 10 million Congolese children to be immunized against poliomyelitis. The Security Council should also take a stand on the misappropriation and destruction of United Nations vaccines and equipment earmarked for this immunization campaign, which the Secretary-General of the United Nations undertook personally to promote;

3. Take note of and adopt sanctions against Rwanda and Uganda for the systematic pillaging of the raw materials of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which is the real motive behind this invasion, contrary to the false

pretext of security considerations which the two aggressor countries are flaunting in their vain, deliberate attempt to deceive the international community as to the real reasons for their criminal enterprise in the Democratic Republic of the Congo;

4. Demand an immediate halt to the fighting between these invasion forces in the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo;

5. Demand the immediate withdrawal of the invasion forces in order that peace and national harmony may prevail once more in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

My Government would also like the Security Council to obtain from Rwanda and Uganda:

1. Respect for the signature which their Heads of State affixed to the document containing the agreement on a ceasefire in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, signed at Lusaka, Zambia, on 10 July 1999;

2. The signing by their protégés, namely, the so-called rebels of the Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie (RCD) and the Mouvement pour la Libération du Congo (MLC), of that ceasefire agreement, in order to speed up the implementation of the peace process in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

My Government would be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

(Signed) André MWAMBA KAPANGA
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1999/882
16 August 1999

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE SITUATION IN SOMALIA

I. INTRODUCTION

1. In their statement (S/PRST/1989/16) of 27 May 1999, members of the Security Council expressed their alarm at the serious deterioration in the political, military and humanitarian situation in Somalia and their concern at the reports of increasing external interference in the country. They requested me to submit periodic reports on the situation in Somalia.

2. The present report is submitted pursuant to that request. It covers developments since the last report on the situation in Somalia, submitted on 16 September 1997 (S/1997/715). In response to requests to relevant regional organizations to submit information on concrete efforts that have been undertaken or are under active consideration in the search for a peaceful solution to the situation in Somalia, information has been received from the League of Arab States (see annex I) and Ethiopia (see annex II).

II. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

A. Peacemaking efforts

3. The "Sodere Group" intended to hold a national reconciliation conference at Bossaso on 1 November 1997, and efforts were being made to secure the participation of Mohamed Ibrahim Egal and Hussein Mohamed Aidid, who had not joined the meeting of the 26 factions at Sodere, Ethiopia, which had formed the National Salvation Council.

4. However, Hussein Aidid and some of his supporters travelled to Cairo, where they joined with Ali Mahdi Mohamed and a number of other Somali faction leaders to attend a reconciliation meeting of Somali leaders. Declared open on 12 November 1997, the meeting was attended by representatives of the National Salvation Council and Hussein Aidid's group. On 22 December 1997, a joint agreement was signed by participants at the Cairo meeting, including Hussein Aidid and Ali Mahdi as Co-Chairmen. Under the agreement, a national reconciliation conference was planned at Baidoa in February 1998 but never took place.

5. To leaders, Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed and General Aden Abdullahi Nur "Gabyow", refused to sign the agreement and left for Addis Ababa. There, in conjunction with some other leaders who had signed the agreement, they convened a meeting of the National Salvation Council, which proposed, without success, some changes to the agreement. Ethiopia blamed Egypt for "hijacking" the Sodere process and a national reconciliation conference has not taken place since then.

6. Somalia has been discussed in various international and regional forums during the period covered in the present report. The first ministerial meeting of the Joint Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Partners Forum, held in Rome on 19 and 20 January 1998, decided to establish a Committee of the IGAD Partners Forum to support the IGAD peace process in Somalia.

7. The Organization of African Unity (OAU), on several occasions in 1998, expressed grave concern that, in spite of the efforts of several actors, substantive progress was still lacking and called for redoubled efforts in the search for a peaceful settlement of the Somali crisis. Grave concern was also expressed over the increased flow of arms into Somalia. At its meeting last month at Algiers, OAU commended the efforts of the Standing Committee on Somalia and, inter alia, stressed the need for continued and close coordination in the efforts aimed at ending the conflict in Somalia.

8. At its seventeenth session, the Council of Ministers of IGAD, meeting at Djibouti on 14 and 15 March 1998, attributed the lack of progress in Somalia to the proliferation of parallel initiatives, a lack of the necessary resolve on the part of the faction leaders and insufficient humanitarian and development support from the international community. It reaffirmed the role of Ethiopia as the country mandated to lead the peace process in Somalia on behalf of IGAD. The international community was invited to adopt a new approach: the Somali peace process should be broadened, shifting the focus away from faction leaders to include representatives of civil society. In particular, the international community was invited to support preferentially those areas of Somalia whose leaders showed a commitment to peace (the so-called "peace dividend" approach). To reduce the danger of "parallel initiatives", IGAD proposed the creation of a mechanism, possibly through its Partners Forum, allowing other countries interested in the Somalia peace process to associate themselves with it. These proposals were endorsed by the IGAD heads of Government at a meeting which immediately followed the ministerial meeting.

9. The Liaison Group on Somalia, formed under the aegis of the IGAD Partners Forum to assist international actors in reaching a common position on Somalia, met for the first time at Addis Ababa on 12 June 1998 under the Chairmanship of Italy. Those attending included IGAD Member States, donors, including the European Commission, and the United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) as well as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Another consultative body, the Standing Committee on Somalia, whose membership is open to IGAD and its Partners Forum Liaison Group members and other interested States and organizations, was formed and met on 5 November 1998 at Addis Ababa under the chairmanship of Ethiopia. Since then, the Liaison Group and the Standing Committee have continued to meet approximately every two months at Addis Ababa at about the same time.

10. From 1 to 5 December 1998, a fact-finding mission of the Standing Committee visited Hargeisa, Garowe and Bossaso. It intends to visit cities in southern Somalia when conditions permit. In the Standing Committee meeting of 29 July 1999, Djibouti outlined a peace plan. The plan contained both cultural and political elements. The cultural element incorporated a programme scheduled to take place between January and June 2000. The Djibouti proposals also involved the establishment of a representative council based on region rather than clan, with one third of the seats reserved for civil society. The council itself would be composed of two chambers: one reserved for elders and the other for political representatives. The council would have a three-year mandate to prepare a transitional constitution and a referendum. An executive council was also proposed to act as the interim government. The Djibouti representative emphasized that the international community should play an important role by providing technical and financial support ab initio. The plan was welcomed by other members of the Standing Committee who agreed to study it.

11. Ministers of the European Union (EU) and the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries in the ACP-EU Council, meeting at Brussels on 29 June 1999, considered Somalia. They expressed the view that only a process leading to a Somali-driven national reconciliation conference inclusive of all geographic areas and all segments of Somali society, could lead to national and international acceptance of a transitional government. They reaffirmed that European Development Fund resources would be made available to Somalia once it could adhere to the Lomé IV Convention.

12. In his 28 October 1998 letter to me, the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States, Ahmed Esmat Abdel Meguid, reported that the Council of the League had adopted a resolution calling on its member States to provide immediate financial assistance in order to support the implementation of the Cairo joint agreement. He expressed his gratitude for the continuing work of the United Nations and the specialized agencies in Somalia, and asked me to find ways of supporting the Mogadishu administration, together with the preparations for the convening of the national reconciliation conference envisaged in the Cairo joint agreement at the earliest possible juncture.

13. The Organization of the Islamic Conference, meeting in Burkina Faso from 28 June to 2 July 1999, called for an international peace and reconciliation conference on Somalia, to be held as soon as possible.

B. Internal situation

"Somaliland"

14. North-West Somalia/"Somaliland" continues to enjoy relative peace, although some skirmishes, which in most instances are not political in nature, are reported from time to time. On 12 October 1997, the leader of "Somaliland", Mohamed Ibrahim Egal, announced a deployment of his troops along "Somaliland's" border with Ethiopia. He accused Ethiopia of providing training and equipment to 300 militia, who allegedly came from the Sool region with the intention of destabilizing "Somaliland". There has been some tension between "Somaliland" and the "administration" in North-East Somalia/"Puntland" over administrative

control of the Sool and Sanaag regions. On 21 February 1999, Mohamed Ibrahim Egal warned "Puntland" against deploying to Sool 100 men who had been recruited from Sool and trained at Garowe for police work.

15. The previous hard-line position taken by the "Somaliland" leadership on the issue of secession of the territory appears to have softened. Mr. Egal told my Representative, David Stephen, on 24 November 1997, that, given the peaceful environment established there, "Somaliland" should be given special status as an autonomous territory until such time as the leaders of "the South" were in a position to negotiate a mutually acceptable future. Such a status, he felt, could allow "Somaliland" access to international financial institutions as well as to other international organizations, such as the International Telecommunication Union.

16. Nevertheless, Mr. Egal has on occasion continued to demand sovereign status for "Somaliland". In his letter of 3 January 1998, he suggested that France, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, the United Kingdom and the United States of America should form a panel to organize the formation of a state in the Somali-inhabited territories in the Horn of Africa. Not to do this, he claimed, would make any call for the territorial integrity of Somalia unrealistic; as an alternative, "Somaliland" demands recognition of its sovereignty and resents vehemently any equation of itself with the factions of Somalia.

17. During a visit to Egypt and Yemen, between the end of February and 12 March 1999, Mr. Egal proposed that "Somaliland" should assist the clans in the "South" in reaching peace and subsequently enter into negotiations on an appropriate formula for reuniting the country. While his proposal reportedly resulted in some tension with hard-line elements in "Somaliland" adamantly opposed to any dialogue with the rest of Somalia, the reactions of some of the neighbouring countries have been positive. The Yemeni Prime Minister was delighted about what he viewed as the softening position of Mr. Egal, and thought that with "Puntland" joining hands with "Somaliland", the first step could be taken towards the resuscitation of Somalia. At Cairo, the Deputy Assistant Minister for Bilateral African Relations described the meetings with Mr. Egal to my Representative as positive and said that Egypt considered that Mr. Egal had a role to play in reuniting the country. Between 27 June and 2 July 1999, Mr. Egal paid a visit to Nairobi at the invitation of President Daniel Arap Moi and had several meetings with him.

"Puntland"

18. On 20 February 1998, Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf told my Representative that his priority was to achieve an administrative structure for the North-East regions at the local level as a constituent unit of a future Somali state, and as the basis for future participation in any national reconciliation conference. Subsequently, the Majerteens, the majority clan in North-East Somalia, held a meeting, together with other smaller clans, at Garowe from 25 February to 4 March 1998. The meeting approved the aim of a single regional administration and chose Garowe as the venue for a constitutional meeting. A follow-up meeting from 10 to 12 March 1998, which included delegates from Sool and Sanaag, agreed to give the name "Puntland State" to the new regional administration. The Garowe constitutional conference elected Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf "President" of

"Puntland State" and Mohamed Abdi Hashi, Chairman of United Somali Party/Somali Salvation Alliance as "Vice-President" on 23 July 1998. The meeting endorsed an interim charter and established a 69-member parliament. The result of the election was challenged by General Mohamed Abshir Musse, the Chairman of the Somali Salvation Democratic Front and Boqor Abdullahi Boqor Musse, a Majerteen traditional leader, both of whom had competed with Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf for presidency.

Mogadishu

19. Following the Cairo joint agreement of 22 December 1997, Ali Mahdi, Osman Hassan Ali "Atto" and Hussein Aidid returned to Mogadishu at the end of January 1998. As it became clear that the national reconciliation conference scheduled for Baidoa on 15 February 1998 would not take place, they embarked on an effort to set up an administration for Benadir region (Mogadishu). Their efforts were encouraged by the Egyptian Special Envoy for Somalia.

20. Progress towards the formation of such an administration was beset by a number of problems, including the claim of Hussein Aidid to be "President" of Somalia as well as the opposition to Ali Mahdi within his Modulod clan. The opposition, which was led by Hussein Haji Bod and Hagi Musse Sudi "Yallahow", both former aides of Ali Mahdi, later included Osman "Atto".

21. On 5 July 1998, 40 Somali leaders left Mogadishu for Libya, to join prayers on the birthday of the Holy Prophet Mohamed. They returned to Mogadishu on 11 July 1998 accompanied by the Libyan Envoy for Somalia. Colonel Muamar Ghaddafi reportedly urged them to finalize the establishment of an administration for Benadir region and to reopen the sea and airports, and promised to provide equipment and six months' financing for a police force for Mogadishu. While Ali Mahdi and Hussein Aidid promised that the Benadir administration would come into being on 18 July 1998, Musse Sudi and other opposition groups claimed that consultations were incomplete and that any attempt to put in place an administration would result in bloody confrontation. There was also a division over the representation of some clans, including minorities.

22. On 3 August 1998, Ali Mahdi and Hussein Aidid announced the formation of an administration for Benadir region. A 50-person Supreme Council was set up to oversee an administrative body for the region. This body was to be led by Hussein Ali Ahmed, a businessman who was named "Governor". On 6 August 1998, Ali Mahdi stated that the seaport had been reopened. Abdi Hassan Awale "Qaybdid", was named Chief of a police force. However, Osman "Atto", Musse Sudi and Hussein Bod opposed the claim that the Benadir administration had been formed. On 10 August 1998, Musse Sudi fired at a ship to prevent its approach to the seaport.

23. For a few months, the administration offered some hope. However, the political situation, especially in North Mogadishu, degenerated. Tension, banditry and intermittent clan fighting increased after March 1999, and fighting erupted within the Wabudan sub-clan of Ali Mahdi's Modulod clan. The residence of the "Governor" was attacked, prompting a retaliatory attack on Musse Sudi's residence. The Mogadishu police appeared to have disintegrated over its

inability to curb intra-clan violence. However, Benadir administration leaders viewed non-payment of salaries, after Libyan support was suspended, as the reason for the disbandment of the police force.

24. The vacuum created by the collapse of the Benadir administration in South Mogadishu was filled by various Islamic Sharia courts that emerged to maintain law and order. These courts, with the support of businessmen, started disbanding the various roadblocks that faction leaders had put in place to extort money.

25. Ali Mahdi left Mogadishu for Egypt on 23 April 1999 for medical treatment, reportedly disillusioned about his leadership of the Modulod clan. Mohamed Hussein Addow was appointed interim Chairman of the Modulod faction. Ali Mahdi told my Representative at Cairo on 30 June 1999 that he intended to return to Mogadishu within weeks to re-establish the Benadir administration and to open the airport and seaport. He said that a national reconciliation conference should be held as soon as possible. Hussein Aidid returned to Mogadishu on 13 July 1999. He also told my Representative that he intended to re-establish the Benadir administration and the police force.

Hiraan region: Belet-Weyne Conference

26. The Pan-Hawiye conference, which began on 19 November 1998, brought together approximately 400 intellectuals, politicians, religious leaders, and representatives of women's and youth groups. Observers from other clans and regions of Somalia were also present. The meeting was reported to have resolved the differences between the Abgal and Murusade clans, on the one hand, and between the Habr-Gedir and the Hawadle on the other. In a statement issued on 26 February 1999, nine traditional leaders announced agreement on a 10-point plan, including the formation of a committee to take the process further. They announced that they intended to move the meeting into a second phase to discuss the political future of the country. At that stage, the Conference Committee intended to make contact with other Somali clans. However, the meeting ended in June 1999 in confusion, with two different persons claiming to have been elected chairman of the Somali Consultative Council, which was established by the conference. Then, a group at Mogadishu claimed to have commenced a preparatory stage of a second phase of a Pan-Hawiye conference now to be held at Mogadishu.

"Jubaland"

27. On 8 May 1998, the Harti militia of General Mohamed Hersi Siad "Morgan" succeeded in repelling an attack on the Somali Patriotic Movement by pushing the combined Habr-Gedir and Marehan militia back to Kamsuma, about 90 kilometres from Kismayo. The Kamsuma bridge, which used to be the only all-weather link between Kismayo and Mogadishu, was blown up. On 6 January 1999, at least 60 people, including civilians, were killed and about 80 people reportedly injured, in fighting which saw the Marehan/Habr-Gedir side briefly entering Kismayo. On 11 June 1999, General "Morgan" and his militia were pushed out of Kismayo, bringing an end to his six-year hold on the city. The operation, led by General Ahmed Warsame among others, was reported by the victors as having been carried out by "Allied Somali Forces". There have also been intermittent clashes in Ras

Kamboni in the Lower Juba region, between the Al-Itihad Islamic Organization and Maqabul militiamen of the Absame clan.

Bay and Bakool regions

28. Since the occupation of the Baidoa area by the late General Aidid on 17 September 1995, guerrilla warfare continued to be waged by the Rahanwein Resistance Army against the militia of Hussein Aidid. On 6 June 1999, the Rahanwein Resistance Army finally succeeded in driving Hussein Aidid's militia out of Baidoa. Some Somalis have claimed, however, that Ethiopian forces crossed the border and actively fought on the side of the Rahanwein Resistance Army. Both Ethiopia and the Rahanwein Resistance Army have denied the charges.

Other regions: Gedo, Lower and Middle Shabelle

29. The Gedo region had been relatively peaceful until 14 March 1998, when the Al-Itihad Islamic Organization engaged the Somali National Front led by General Omar Haji Mohamed "Masale" in a successful bid to control El-Wak District. About 23 combatants were reportedly killed while many were injured. By 5 August 1998, however, the Marehan clan appeared to have settled the rift between Al-Itihad and General Omar Haji Mohamed "Masale".

30. On 8 April 1999, at Belet-Hawa in Gedo region, the self-proclaimed Chairman of the Somali National Front, the Bardere District Commissioner, and two others were assassinated in what appeared to be a power struggle within the Somali National Front. Then on 21 April 1999, the militia of another member of the clan, who claimed to have succeeded the assassinated Somali National Front Chairman, attacked the militia of General Omar Haji who had signed the Addis Ababa agreement of 1993 as Chairman of the Somali National Front at Burdhubo town. Ten people were reportedly killed and 16 wounded before the Burale militia retreated to their bases at Belet-Hawa. There have been persistent allegations of Ethiopian troop movements within the region. The United Nations Political Office for Somalia has not been in a position to establish the veracity of these reports.

Merka

31. Merka, until recently a place enjoying relative peace, had begun to attract a number of aid agencies, which established themselves in the town after relocating from Mogadishu. However, the situation has deteriorated since April 1999.

C. Role of women and minority groups

32. Women and minority groups in Somalia have continued to express concern over the lack of law and order in the country. On 1 June 1999, the Chairperson of a Somali NGO, Save Somali Women and Children, submitted a petition on behalf of 120 women to my Representative for transmission to the Security Council. The petition noted that Somali women have traditionally been excluded from politics and carry the main burden of the suffering in Somalia. In particular, because of the situation within IGAD, they felt that the United Nations may be best

placed to help all Somalis to restore their government, paying particular attention to the role women should play. At a meeting held in Nairobi from 21 to 25 June 1999, a delegation of representatives of five women's groups from different regions of Somalia established a campaign for Somali women's political participation. Other Somali women have been holding monthly vigils at Nairobi in support of peace.

33. My Representative has also been meeting with several spokespersons for minority groups in Somalia, including the Chairmen of the Somali African Muki Organization, and the Somali National Union as well as the Sultan of the Jiddo, who emphasized the exclusion of minorities from the political process and the serious discrimination suffered by minorities in different parts of Somalia.

34. On 14 July 1999, Abdulkadir Mohamed Aden "Zoppe", the leader of the Digil and Mirifle people, issued a statement in which he called for the establishment of an international war crimes tribunal for Somalia, inter alia, to investigate and punish Hussein Aidid and his militia, who, he claimed, had carried out ethnic cleansing on the territory of the Digil and Mirifle people.

D. Allegations of arms flows into Somalia

35. In his letter of 31 March 1998, Mr. Egal said that the neighbouring countries should be told in unmistakable terms to stop giving arms and ammunition to the warring factions in Somalia. In his second letter of 8 August 1998, he deplored the fact that, at a time when the reservoir of ammunition left over from the cold war period was drying up and the warlords were no longer able to terrorize the population, new supplies appeared to be arriving in Somalia. He called for the arms embargo against Somalia to be enforced.

36. There have been claims by Somalis that Eritrea has been shipping arms and fighters of the Oromo Liberation Front into Somalia. In January 1999, at least two flights arrived at Balidogle from Assab, Eritrea, and it was alleged that the flights carried arms. There were also reports of further arms deliveries by sea at Merka in mid-February and early May 1999, and at Faax in mid-June 1999. It was also widely reported that together with the arms, Oromo Liberation Front fighters disembarked at Merka and Faax. On 31 March 1999, Ali Mahdi accused Ethiopia of providing arms to his opponents, notably to Hussein Haji Bod. Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf wrote to me on 6 May 1999 condemning the troops and arms that were allegedly arriving in Somalia from Eritrea. In mid-July 1999, officials of the Somali Consultative Council issued statements in which they condemned the presence of Oromo Liberation Front fighters in Somalia. They drew attention to what they considered to be a danger of a degeneration of security in Somalia, warning that the entire region was likely to be destabilized. On 8 April 1999, Hussein Aidid, Ali Mahdi and General Omar Haji wrote to me claiming that Ethiopia had not only exported arms into Gedo region but also continued to occupy Somali territory. They asked the Security Council to request Ethiopia to remove its troops from Somalia. UNPOS has neither the mandate nor the capacity to verify these reports. Both Ethiopia and Eritrea have denied any involvement in arms shipments into Somalia.

III. WORK OF THE UNITED NATIONS

37. Since my last report to the Security Council, the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, Kieran Prendergast, has convened on four occasions ambassadorial meetings of external actors on Somalia, on 7 October 1997, 16 June 1998, 15 December 1998 and 13 April 1999. They were attended by members of the Council, countries that have undertaken peacemaking initiatives, and relevant regional and subregional organizations. The meetings offered an opportunity for an informal exchange of views and coordination of initiatives on Somalia. It was suggested that such meetings take place more frequently than in the past, and the Under-Secretary-General has undertaken to convene them three times a year, or more frequently if need be.

38. I visited the Horn of Africa region between 29 April and 10 May 1998, and consulted on Somalia with the leaders of Ethiopia, Djibouti, Kenya and Eritrea. The then President of Djibouti, Hassan Guled Aptidon, expressed the views of most of the leaders when he called for a halt to what he described as "political tourism" of Somali leaders, in which they go to various capitals to sign documents which are not honoured. He said he would like all future reconciliation efforts to take place inside Somalia. At Nairobi, I had a meeting with external actors involved with Somalia, including the ambassadors of Member States and representatives of international organizations and non-governmental organizations. At my request, Mohamed Sahnoun, my Special Envoy in Africa, met a wide range of Somali leaders at Nairobi.

39. I asked Under-Secretary-General Prendergast to visit Nairobi in November 1998 to assess the prospects for peace in Sudan and Somalia. On Somalia, he exchanged views with President Daniel Arap Moi and Foreign Minister Bonaya Godana at Nairobi and met the Italian Special Envoy for Somalia, a delegation of the European Commission and a wide range of Somali faction leaders or their representatives, as well as leaders of Somali civil society, including women. In addition, he exchanged views with other external actors on Somalia, including heads of United Nations agencies and programmes, and representatives of non-governmental organizations. Under-Secretary-General Prendergast reported that the Kenyan authorities were supportive of the IGAD "building-block" approach as the way forward in Somalia, and that they were optimistic that the Standing Committee could assist the international community in speaking with one voice on the Somali peace process.

40. A common strand in Under-Secretary-General Prendergast's discussions with his Somali interlocutors was a strong feeling that the days of the "warlords" were over. Most of them called for a renewed United Nations effort to disarm militia members in the country. However, there was less disagreement on the way forward in the peace process. While many supported the "building-block" approach, some expressed the fear that it could lead to unsustainable "emirates" and/or to many "presidents" in an absurd fragmentation of the country, ultimately reaching as far down as the district if not the village level. Under-Secretary-General Prendergast emphasized my continued interest and that of the Security Council in finding a solution to the Somali problem, and assured the Somali leaders of continuing commitment of the United Nations to a political solution. At the same time, he stressed to them that the onus for peace rested

with Somalis themselves, and that members of the international community could only assist them in those efforts.

41. As the Council is aware, following submission of my report dated 16 September 1997 (S/1997/715), I appointed David Stephen as my Representative for Somalia as well as head of UNPOS. With the approval of the Security Council, a professional staff member has been added to UNPOS, which continues to be based at Nairobi. This has enabled UNPOS to enhance its briefing and reporting role, and in particular to improve its contacts with Somali leaders in Somalia. UNPOS staff have, during the period covered by the present report, made visits to all parts of the country, ensuring regular contacts and dialogue with all sectors of opinion inside Somalia. My Representative has also paid several consultation visits both to the capitals of Governments and to the headquarters of regional organizations that are involved in the peace process in Somalia. These efforts have helped to improve the flow of information among external actors, and have also enhanced understanding of the need for a uniformity of approach in fostering peace in Somalia, in an environment previously characterized by a multiplicity of approaches and initiatives.

IV. HUMANITARIAN SITUATION

42. The United Nations agencies distinguish three different operational environments within Somalia: "zones of crisis", "zones of transition" and "zones of recovery". Each of these environments requires different humanitarian and rehabilitation strategy, and distinct types of external assistance. Integral to the analysis is the need to address five fundamental issues: (a) chronic food insecurity; (b) population displacement; (c) collapse of social services and infrastructure; (d) lack of good governance and associated security; and (e) the recurrence of natural disasters and lack of emergency preparedness. In zones of crisis, the emphasis is on ensuring better food security, provision of basic and life-saving social services, and assistance to community-level capacity-building. In zones of transition, greater focus is placed on the latter. In zones of recovery, the emphasis is on providing technical support for good governance and support to capacity-building in the economic and social sectors.

43. As outlined in the Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for 1999, the main objective of the United Nations is to prevent the current situation in the South from developing into famine and to continue the groundwork for establishing stability, self-reliance and security in the North. In order to meet these objectives the United Nations has adopted a number of sectoral interventions, including in the areas of food security, health and nutrition, water and sanitation, education and public administration. In addition, there are a number of cross-cutting interventions to ensure programme coherence and protection of civilian populations, including the promotion and protection of human rights, and inter-agency planning and coordination. It is envisaged that if the programme is fully implemented it will benefit about two thirds of the population. The 1999 Consolidated Appeal presents the programme in detail, outlining the priority requirements: $65.7 million for humanitarian activities, and $29.3 million for rehabilitation and recovery activities. Emergency relief

activities, targeting over one million persons at risk, have been reasonably well funded, while rehabilitation and recovery programmes have not.

44. The implementation of a humanitarian and rehabilitation strategy for Somalia requires the efforts of a number of key actors ranging from international organizations, including eight United Nations agencies (UNDP, the World Food Programme (WFP), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the United Nations Development Fund for Women, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, the World Health Organization (WHO) and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations), the International Committee of the Red Cross and the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, and some 40 NGOs, as well as local communities, administrations and national NGOs. The implementing partners of the United Nations include the following international NGOs: Action Contre La Faim, Agency for Cooperation and Research in Development, African Medical and Research Foundation, European Committee for Agricultural Training, Coordinating Committee of the Organization for Voluntary Service, Comitato Internazionale per lo Sviluppo dei Popoli, International Medical Corps, InterSos Humanitarian Organization for Emergency, Mediche hulp aan de derde wereld (Health for all in the third world), Mercy International, Médicins Sans Frontières - Spain, Netherlands and Belgium, Muslim-Aid-UK, Norwegian Church Aid, Swedish Church Relief, Trocaire and World Vision. In cooperation with the partners of the Somalia Aid Coordination Body, overall coordination of humanitarian aid is undertaken by the office of the United Nations resident and humanitarian coordinator for Somalia.

45. Approximately two thirds of the United Nations staff working on Somalia (international and national) are located inside the country and mainly concentrated in the northern regions. For the purposes of maintaining a "cross-border" operation into the unstable South and Central areas and to provide overall coordination and programme support, the operational headquarters of most international organizations remain at Nairobi.

46. The effects of the continuing internal armed conflict upon the population have been compounded by extensive flooding in the southern regions followed by drought in most areas of Somalia. Severe food insecurity and disease, including cholera, have put one million persons at risk in the South, while in the North water and pasture shortage has dramatically depleted livestock, the resource base for most of the population.

47. The 1997-1998 floods in the southern region were the worst in decades and affected the lives of nearly one million Somalis, killing over 2,000 people in the acute phase of the emergency. In support of community responses, United Nations agencies and NGOs engaged in a massive relief operation. In the first phase, flood victims were supplied with basic survival items, including food rations, blankets, plastic sheeting, sandbags and cooking utensils. A second phase of the operation was planned for the rehabilitation of rudimentary services, including safe water and sanitation, agricultural infrastructure and for strengthening local health units to address major health problems. The planned follow-up was realized only marginally, however, due to the paucity of funding - in marked contrast to funding for the first phase - thereby making these areas of chronic disaster more vulnerable for the next crisis. A food

crisis accompanied by drought soon followed, beginning in the last quarter of 1998, just one year after the floods.

48. By the end of 1998, food insecurity and deterioration in health conditions were rife in central and southern Somalia due to the conflict and climate. The crisis continued as of mid-1999. Unusual population displacement, the most obvious sign of severe stress, had begun by November 1998. Sedentary farmer households began to move from the worst areas of Bay and Bakool (normally the breadbasket of Somalia) to other areas in search of food, better security and water. Over 40,000 persons moved to Gedo, Lower Shabelle, Middle Juba and Mogadishu. The communities are particularly vulnerable to outbreaks of communicable diseases, notably measles, malaria and diarrhoeal diseases, such as cholera. After the first confirmed cases of cholera in early December 1998, by the end of February 1999 there were over 3,000 cases and nearly 200 deaths reported. By May 1999, the situation had stabilized.

49. In the southern and central regions, over one million people are facing serious food shortages and 300,000 of them are currently in need of food aid. Their long-term food security situation is alarming and likely to deteriorate as a result of ongoing insecurity and poor prospects for the current harvest. The number of people requiring humanitarian assistance is therefore likely to increase. In response, United Nations agencies and NGOs have continued the large cross-border operation from Kenya, delivering urgently needed humanitarian supplies, including food aid, medicines and shelter. Since January 1999, nearly 13,500 tons of relief food have been distributed by WFP and CARE, benefiting over 700,000 people at Bay, Bakool, Gedo, Hiran, Middle Juba and Lower Shabelle regions. UNICEF and its partner agencies have distributed over 2,600 tons of "supermix" (a nutritious blend of corn and sugar), benefiting about 200,000 children. Some 80,000 children received vaccination against measles together with vitamin A supplementation. Over 27 water sources were rehabilitated, benefiting over 100,000 people at Bay, Bakool, Gedo, Middle Shabelle and Hiran.

50. In the effort to support farming communities in the South, United Nations agencies and NGOs completed a major seed distribution by the end of March 1999, the beginning of the primary planting season of 1999. On 6 July 1999, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and the Somalia Aid Coordination Body concurrently issued a donor alert for southern and central Somalia, requesting for US$ 17.5 million and covering the period from 1 July to 31 December 1999. Over 1,700 tons of seeds were distributed to farmers of Bay and Bakool regions in southern Somalia. In the North, successive failures of rains resulted in diminished pasture and lack of groundwater. Up to 50 per cent of livestock died in hard-hit areas. An inter-agency response was established by March 1999 to support communities through targeted food relief, water trucking, and rehabilitation of water sources. The arrival of rains in May 1999 and the lifting of the ban on imports of livestock from the Horn by some Gulf States helped the situation in the North, though there is still a very large need for rehabilitation work and disaster preparedness in this stable area.

51. Geographically, the areas experiencing recovery are mostly in the northern part of Somalia, where approximately one third of the total population lives. The economy in the North has demonstrated surprising resilience, with expanding interregional and export-oriented trade. The ban imposed on the importation of

Somali livestock from the Horn to some Gulf countries had a very negative impact on the economy. Consequently, the emerging local administrations in the North-West ("Somaliland") and North-East ("Puntland") suffered from lack of export tax revenues. Nevertheless, trade has continued to develop. The port of Berbera has become the most active Somali seaport and the second most important seaport for Ethiopia after Djibouti. Similarly, such airports as those at Hargeisa, Berbera and Bossaso provide an important source of revenue for local authorities and also encourage economic development. Nevertheless, the stability of these areas is fragile. Regions of recovery still need much support to build their capacities in order to sustain and improve upon their achievements since the end of the civil war.

52. United Nations projects in the North have been designed to give essential support towards improving administrative capacities and private economic expansion. Training programmes have been provided for local administrative structures, assistance given to urban planning and management as well as to road repair and sanitation. United Nations agencies, working closely with international NGOs and local partners, have succeeded with numerous small, self-sustaining projects, particularly in the urban centres.

53. The security of humanitarian activities continues to be a grave cause for concern. On 26 January 1999, Dr. Manmohan Singh Boghal, a Kenyan citizen working for Terra Nuova, was murdered in a remote village between Bardera and Garbahare towns in Gedo region by men believed to be working with him. Dr. Boghal had been involved in vaccination programmes against the rinderpest disease. The killers stole project money and equipment. The Somalia Aid Coordination Body recommended the suspension of all rehabilitation and development activities in Gedo region as local authorities, who apparently know the culprits, have been unable to bring them to justice.

54. On 20 March 1999, Deena Umbarger, a United States citizen employed by a non-governmental organization, United Methodist Committee on Relief, was killed close to the Kenya-Somali border. Ms. Umbarger had planned to conduct a humanitarian assessment mission in Somalia.

55. An Italian national, Dr. Stefano Sotgia, employed as a veterinarian by the Italian organization Terra Nuova, was kidnapped on 16 April 1999 at Hagar, about 180 kilometres West of Kismayo. The kidnapping was understood to be linked to accusations that Terra Nuova had not been providing enough services and operations in the area. The kidnappers demanded $100,000 in ransom for the release of the aid worker. The Somalia Aid Coordination Body condemned this kidnapping and called for his immediate release. He was finally released on 9 May 1999.

56. On 18 April 1999, firing was reported in and around the compound of the non-governmental organization Action Contre la Faim at Merka. In March 1999, a death threat letter in the form of a Fatwa had been issued against the former WHO country director on the basis of a number of unsubstantiated allegations. The United Nations designated official, as a precautionary measure, relocated United Nations international staff members from Merka on 21 April 1999. The attempt by the dominant political clan in the area to revamp the local administration has yet to bear fruit.

V. OBSERVATIONS

57. Despite persistent security threats and rising distribution costs caused by clan conflict, mines and other problems, the United Nations agencies and their humanitarian partners continue to deliver food aid to a high proportion of the most affected areas and to most settlements known to have incorporated displaced families. However, in areas threatened by sporadic armed conflict, including several major urban areas (Mogadishu, Kismayo and Baidoa), and in parts of the Bay, Bakool and Hiraan regions, aid delivery could not be maintained at requisite levels.

58. Greater investment is needed to strengthen local community capacities and resilience to meet the demands of man-made and natural emergencies. In the more stable areas in the north, where aid agencies have a more permanent presence, emphasis should continue to be placed on capacity-building, in close collaboration with local administrations. The need for international humanitarian relief aid is demonstrably less where such rehabilitation investments have been made.

59. "Loud" emergencies in Somalia have been met by substantial short-term responses from the donor community. However, the operational capacity of humanitarian agencies has gradually been eroded, primarily owing to inadequate donor support for medium-term rehabilitation measures. For United Nations agencies, this is shown by the weak donor response to the 1999 Consolidated Appeal, which was severely prioritized and focused in response to donor wishes. As a result, the capacity of the agencies to provide efficient, effective humanitarian relief has been weakened, making response to future crises ever more difficult. Moreover, inadequate medium-term funding reduces the ability of humanitarian agencies to provide crucial, if more mundane, activities related to disaster prevention and the building of social resilience.

60. Such longer-term support is a prerequisite for any agency to be able to maintain its staff and its presence. For example, after the extreme floods of 1997 and 1998, it was clear that humanitarian agencies had not been able to do nearly enough to help rehabilitate the water sources and irrigation infrastructure fundamental to improving water access and strengthening disaster prevention. Another direct effect of inadequate medium-term funding has been the decline in coverage by non-governmental organizations in central and southern Somalia, which in turn has led to insufficient actors in the field able to work with communities in crisis. Even in the north, the decline in funds has hindered United Nations assistance in building local capacity to, in turn, respond to natural disasters such as drought. In addition, the absence of major rehabilitation work hampers efforts to encourage the return of refugees into the stable areas of Somalia.

61. Little or no development has taken place in Somalia for 10 years. Indeed, the country's development process has gone into reverse. Most children receive no health care or education; two generations have had no access to formal education. Life expectancy at birth is surely lower than the sub-Saharan average of 51 years. On almost all development indicators, Somalia ranks among the poorest and most deprived countries in the world. Virtually all the infrastructure of government – from buildings and communications facilities to

furniture and office equipment – has been looted. All government archives and records, libraries, files and museums have been totally destroyed. In most of the country, there are no police, judiciary or civil service. Communications, apart from private satellite and cellular telephones and radio links, are non-existent. Electricity is not available on a public basis, but only to those who can afford generators. There is no postal service. The economy is in dire straits. Exports of agricultural products, such as bananas, have plummeted. The ban imposed by some countries in the Gulf region on the import of live animals from the Horn of Africa as a result of last year's epidemic of Rift Valley Fever has now been lifted. However, while it remained in force, it caused economic hardship, deprived local administrations in the north of much-needed export tax income and led, through over-grazing, to serious environmental damage. Some natural resources, such as fish, are being exploited, mainly by foreigners, without regulation or monitoring.

62. In both informal and formal discussions of the Security Council, member States have expressed concern about the increasingly evident effects of the lack of a functioning central government in Somalia. Somalia is being seen as a "black hole" where the absence of law and order is attracting criminals and subversives. The Prime Minister of Yemen told my Representative that his Government was concerned about refugee flows from Somalia. He expressed fears that Somalia was being used as a transit-point for the trafficking of narcotic drugs and as a haven for terrorists. President Moi of Kenya called on the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to repatriate tens of thousands of Somali refugees living in north-eastern Kenya. He accused the Somalis of abusing Kenyan hospitality by smuggling arms into the country. To worsen the situation, a Somali militia group disarmed a Kenyan platoon on 1 July 1999 and stole its equipment. Most of the stolen goods were returned after the Government of Kenya threatened punitive action against the perpetrators. A batch of fake Somali shillings, with an estimated value and $4 million, arrived in Somalia on 9 and 10 April 1999, followed by a second batch, worth about $5 million, on 8 June 1999. As a result, the value of the Somali shilling fell from about 7.5 shillings to the dollar to over 10,000 shillings to the dollar. There are now four different Somali shillings in circulation in Somalia.

63. As a country without a national government, Somalia remains unique. The functions that states perform, such as the provision of social services, including health and education, the regulation, for example, of the movement of goods and persons, control of the environment, airspace and coasts, and so on, as well as the representation of the Somali people in intergovernmental and international fora, are absent, notwithstanding the fact that administrations in some parts of the country, notably in north-western Somalia ("Somaliland") and north-east Somalia ("Puntland"), have begun to provide some basic services to their people.

64. Somalia is different from other African societies in crisis, given its fundamentally homogeneous character. There is no major religious divide, ethnic division or dispute over the allocation of wealth derived from natural resources. Rather, Somalia is a polity in crisis. It is divided on clan lines, with each clan fearful of the incursions of others. The violence, where it is not simple banditry, is mainly defensive in nature. The crucial missing

ingredient is trust. Without trust, there can be no peace or security in Somalia and no central government can be re-established.

65. While a negotiated settlement of Somalia's crisis has continued to be elusive, some important steps forward have been made. Two years ago, my then Special Envoy, Ismat Kittani, concluded that an essential pre-condition for political progress in Somalia was the development of a greater uniformity of approach on the part of the international community. Here, important progress has been made. In addition to the ambassadorial meeting, which meets in New York, the Standing Committee, which meets in the region, is already proving its worth as a forum for the exchange of information and assessments on the situation in Somalia. I believe that, as a result, the danger of a proliferation of initiatives, previously deplored by a number of Governments, has now been minimized. In particular, the ideas submitted by Djibouti, in its capacity as Chairman of IGAD, to the Standing Committee, on 29 July 1999, with the aim of speeding up the IGAD process, are in my view worthy of serious consideration.

66. Within Somalia itself, there is increasing evidence that ordinary Somalis are tired of violence and are pressuring their leaders to opt for peace. In the absence of any externally sponsored peace process since the Cairo meeting, Somalis are increasingly taking political initiatives themselves, through regional conferences, often organized by traditional leaders and informal cross-clan contacts. Civil society is beginning to make itself heard. Women's groups, in particular, have become much more active. At the same time, there has been increased criticism of the role of the Somali faction leaders.

67. Approximately half of Somali territory is peaceful. While struggles continue over control of some key southern towns, much of the day-to-day violence in Somalia is now criminal rather than political in origin. Indeed, a new challenge has presented itself: increasingly, the militias do not respond to the orders of clan leaders, but of local commanders only.

68. Many Somali leaders have informed the United Nations Political Office for Somalia that they would join a national meeting. Many Somalis have in mind the type of national reconciliation conference agreed upon in both the Sodere and Cairo agreements, i.e., a meeting of representatives of the major clan groups, plus minorities, to discuss future constitutional arrangements and the allocation of posts in a future national government. However, several Somali leaders have said that they believe that no progress is possible while Eritrea and Ethiopia continue to be at war and, in the view of such leaders, to involve Somali faction leaders in that war. The conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia is clearly having a highly adverse effect on the situation in Somalia. Reports of arms flows into Somalia, in contravention of the embargo established by Security Council resolutions 733 (1992), are deeply worrying. The United Nations Political Office for Somalia lacks the requisite mandate and capacity to verify these reports.

69. The task of re-establishing a functioning state in Somalia will require, then, not only an enormous effort of political will on the part of the Somali people and their leaders, a massive rebuilding operation will also be a necessary accompaniment of any peace process in Somalia. The two processes will

need to be carefully coordinated, with international support being carefully calibrated to reinforce those tendencies in Somali society that are working constructively together.

70. I believe that the stage has now been reached at which it may be appropriate for the United Nations to play an enhanced role in Somalia. I would propose that consideration should be given to action on two fronts. First, the United Nations, working impartially and objectively with interested member States, especially within the IGAD process, should do more to help bring about national unity and the restoration of a national government in Somalia. In this connection, the following steps could be considered: (a) as foreseen in my previous report, a general review of the role of the United Nations in Somalia, including the possible re-location of some United Nations programmes and agencies, as well as the Political Office, to Somalia; and, (b) the establishment of a trust fund for Somalia to provide financial support for the emerging process, for example for meetings by Somalia.

71. In addition, consideration might be given to whether, in advance of political agreements on the formation of a national government, action could be taken by the international community to assist Somalia to recover its sovereignty in certain limited fields, for example the protection of offshore natural resources. Efforts could also be made to limit the introduction of illegal arms and weapons into the country.

72. Other possibilities may exist in the area of developmental assistance. Although some development funds are reaching local administrations in Somalia, many international and national financial and donor institutions are required by their statutes to cooperate only with established state institutions, such as ministries of finance or central banks. It would be a challenge to the ingenuity of the international community to establish mechanisms which would allow financial assistance to flow into Somalia even before a formal central government and other institutions were re-established. I urge international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the European Development Fund, in administering the Lomé IV Convention, to exercise flexibility in this regard, re-examining as necessary their legal and financial arrangements to take this unique case into account.

Annex I

[Original: Arabic]

EFFORTS MADE BY THE LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES IN CONNECTION WITH THE SITUATION IN SOMALIA

1. At its last session, the one hundred and eleventh, the Council of the League of Arab States adopted its resolution 111/5846, in which it called upon the Somali parties to honour their agreements, to cooperate with the pan-Arab, regional and international efforts for national reconciliation, and to establish a national authority to restore the State of Somalia to its place in the international community, in the Arab family and in its regional setting as an effective State. Between the one hundred and eleventh and one hundred and twelfth sessions of the Council, the Secretary-General of the League received numerous Somali leaders, charged them with responsibility for the deteriorating situation in Somalia and urged them to place the interest of Somalia above all other considerations, to spare the Somali people further afflictions from war and divisiveness, to make the utmost effort to achieve the security, stability and national reconciliation that are critical to respect for and the maintenance of Somalia's sovereignty, and to avoid giving any pretexts for the violation of the country's territorial integrity by any outside forces.

2. Whether through its membership in the international standing committee on Somalia or through its direct contacts in the Somali arena and its regional and international relations, the secretariat of the League is endeavouring to achieve the following:

The compliance of all countries, and particularly the countries geographically contiguous to Somalia, with Security Council resolution 733 (1992) concerning the embargo on deliveries of weapons to Somalia; respect for Somali sovereignty; commitment to the territorial integrity of Somalia and its inviolability; the basic responsibility of the Somali leaders to keep their country aloof from conflicts between neighbouring States and, in particular, from the ongoing conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea;

Close cooperation with international and regional organizations and with the countries interested in the situation in Somalia with a view to reaching a consensus on modalities for helping the Somalis to resolve their dilemma and restore the institutions of the State so as to preserve Somalia's unity and territorial integrity;

A greater role for the United Nations in the Somali context and the assumption of its basic responsibilities for national reconciliation; the relocation of the United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) from Nairobi to Mogadishu for this purpose; and the provision of technical and humanitarian assistance to the Somali people by the United Nations through its specialized agencies;

The endeavour, in coordination with various international, regional and other organizations and with neighbouring States, to help the Somalis to convene a national reconciliation conference for the purpose of forming a unified Somali authority.

Annex II

Recent Developments in The IGAD Peace Process on Somalia

Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
August 1999

Prepared for the United Nations

THE CHALLENGE OF SOMALIA

Following the overthrow of the Government of Siadh Barre at the beginning of 1991 and the expansion of the conflict in the country, Somalis have been living without a state. The civil war in Somalia has deeply aggravated the political, economic and humanitarian situation in the country, prompting a number of efforts, including a major UN operation in 1992/93, to address the crisis. To date, despite all the attempts made by neighboring states and others, Somalia remains a country without a state, and the Somalis, a people without a Government.

This state of affairs has had a disastrous effect on the life of the Somali people. Although in some parts of the country — in the northwest ("Somaliland") and northeast ("Puntland") there is relatively better security, some administration and social services — most of the rest of the country is in ruin. Although trade takes place, in addition to the general insecurity, living standards have dropped and even the provision of emergency assistance is threatened. The crisis has implications beyond Somalia's borders as well. Not only do neighboring countries bear the brunt of the socio-economic fallout from the Somali crisis, but they increasingly face the threat from organizations based on terror and destabilization that benefit from the absence of control in the stateless state of Somalia.

As a country sharing the longest border with Somalia hosting hundreds of thousands of Somali refugees and with a population of some 2.5 million Somali speaking citizens, Ethiopia was mandated by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) to take the lead in helping the Somali people find peace and national reconciliation. Although a number of major national reconciliation conferences were held in the region, the lack of readiness by faction leaders to compromise and the inability of the international community to speak to the Somalis with one voice ensured that Somalia remained stateless and directionless for almost a decade.

The lack of progress to achieve peace and national reconciliation could be attributed to two factors which are interrelated:

1. The Somali faction leaders and warlords have not been ready to give up their personal interests for the sake of national reconciliation. The perpetuation of the status quo had been more profitable for them.
2. External actors, particularly from beyond the immediate sub-region have involved themselves in initiatives that run counter to the peace process undertaken by IGAD. The proliferation of initiatives has encouraged the Somali faction leaders to continue to play one external actor against the other in order to ensure that the status quo is maintained in the country.

It was in recognition of the stalemated peace process that the Heads of State of IGAD member states met in Djibouti on March 15 and 16, 1998 and resolved to undertake a new approach to the resolution of the Somali crisis.

THE "BUILDING BLOCK, PEACE - DIVIDEND" APPROACH

IGAD decided to broaden the peace process by shifting the emphasis from promoting concord between faction leaders towards enabling the greater participation of the Somali civil society in the interest of laying a more solid foundation for peace. In this regard the involvement of clan and religious leaders, elders, civic and social groups, non-governmental organization, intellectuals, the business community as well as women and youth groups was considered essential.

The IGAD leaders also resolved to expand international consultation and involve those who can contribute to the peace process as long as they do not engage in parallel and contradictory initiatives. They also called on the international community to politically, diplomatically and financially rehabilitate regions in the country where there is a commitment to peace, stability and national reconciliation (the 'peace dividend' approach).

As the mandated country, Ethiopia began to take steps to implement the new approach decided in Djibouti and known in more simple terms as the "building block, peace dividend approach". Efforts were made to try to develop better lines of communication with and between various actors/groups in Somalia, and to strengthen what was believed to be an emerging international consensus behind the IGAD peace process. In this regard, the sub-region was encouraged by the report issued in April 1998 by the United Nations Secretary General on conflict in Africa in which it was stated that, "it is desirable that the international community should strife to complement, rather than supplant African efforts to resolve Africa's problems".

Bringing the international community on board to back the IGAD peace initiative was facilitated by the establishment of the IGAD Partners Forum (IPF) Committee on Somali which met on May 4 and November 19, 1998. Attended by virtually all the countries and organizations that could play a role in bringing the Somalis to peace and national reconciliation, the meetings endorsed the new IGAD approach, warned those "hampering the peace process" and established a Liaison Group to interact on a more regular basis with IGAD. The Liaison Group was chaired by Italy and included the United States, Norway, France, Egypt, the European Commission and the United Nations. It was clear from the outset that the formation of the IPF did not represent a new and parallel initiative. Indeed the IPF's role was to work "in close consultation with existing coordinating structures to support the IGAD Peace Process and to consult on how best to mobilize the international community to assist the regional initiative".

EVERYONE UNDER ONE ROOF

As the process of international consultation gathered momentum, it was felt necessary to "bring everyone under one roof" within a forum of consultation and coordination that met more frequently and that suggested measures to push the IGAD peace process forward. The need prompted the establishment of the 'Standing Committee', in October 1998 in which were represented the IGAD countries, the member states of the IPF Liaison Group, the IGAD, OAU and Arab League Secretariats, Egypt, and Yemen. (Libya is also welcome to join the Standing Committee).

The Standing Committee quickly felt the need to link economic support and rehabilitation actions with the peace process; to enhance the problem solving capacities of those engaged in the peace process; to develop the criteria for the 'peace dividend', to mobilize funds; and to encourage Somali civil society. More than anything the Committee was an embodiment of a common international approach towards the Somali crisis although there were differences among a few committee members on a number of issues.

While serving as a forum which assisted the development of confidence between members, the Committee felt it was important to build a solid knowledge about the actual situation in Somalia. It believed important to assess the political base of the Somali actors, the place of civil society, and the identity of those Somali forces that would be part of the 'broadening of the peace process'. At the same time, the Committee understood the necessity to carry out evaluations/assessments by Somali and international experts regarding governance, community based initiatives, the work of NGO's, inter-clan relations, the role of the militias, the role of 'concerned parties', questions relating to private property and the issue of expropriated private property — with a focus to practically assist the Somalis and the international community to achieve results. One step taken in this regard involved the transfer of some information in the hands of the Somali Aid Coordinating Body to the IGAD Secretariat.

FINDING FACTS

In order to see the situation in Somalia at first hand the Standing Committee embarked on a fact-finding mission to the country during the first week of December 1998. It visited "Somliland" and "Puntland" two areas of relative stability. It could not visit Mogadiscio. The persistence of international differences in addition to the relationship between the administration and the armed opposition in the city ensured the cancellation of the mission to the capital.

Following the Fact Finding Mission, the Standing Committee agreed among other things on the need to continue to support "Somaliland" and "Puntland" as stable areas (particularly in infrastructure); to help strengthen local governance; to help returned refugees and demobilized persons and to try to bring the two administrations closer together (in view of their dispute over Sool and Sanaag).

PLUSES AND MINUSES

In addition the Standing Committee made some efforts through its members to have the Saudi ban on livestock exports from Somalia lifted. On various occasion stress was made on the need to observe the arms embargo on the transfer of weapons to Somalia instituted by the United Nations Security Council in 1992 (UNSC Res. 733/1992). More recently members have expressed their interest in seeking ways to speed up the peace process and, in this regard, looked at a new proposal tabled by Djibouti. It is also strongly believed that the peace dividend materialize and that current rehabilitation support actions be linked clearly with the peace process.

It must be said that the Standing Committee continues to demonstrate its use as a forum to strengthen international consensus behind the IGAD peace initiative and to generate ideas to help the peace process. On the other hand, however, the Committee has not seen success in mobilizing funds. Neither has membership in the committee meant that every country has avoided taking measures to exacerbate the situation in Somalia. But all things considered, the effort by most in the international community to work in a similar direction is encouraging and this has been recognized by both the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity.

The OAU, too, continues to be concerned with the continuing crisis in Somalia. The issue of Somalia is taken up at every Ministerial and Summit conference. Most recently in Algiers the OAU renewed its call from a year ago for a fact-finding mission to Somalia. It described the situation in the country as "deteriorating" and called for international assistance for those areas in which peace and stability have been established.

THE INFLUX OF ARMS

In recent months, those committed to peace in Somalia have been alarmed by the influx of arms into the country. The outbreak of conflict elsewhere in the Horn has resulted in a further complication in the Somali situation as arms destined to factions and groups having the objective of destabilizing neighboring countries have been introduced into Somalia. Such destructive activity can only encourage those receiving arms to opt for the military way out, thereby prolonging the resolution of the Somali crisis.

A letter outlining Ethiopia's grave concerns in this regard was submitted to the President of the United Nations Security Council on May 14, 1999, followed by a letter voicing similar concerns by the Djibouti Government on May 24, 1999. The arming of the groups that seek to destabilize the sub-region constitutes a threat to peace in Somalia and the neighborhood as a whole and firm reactions by neighboring states to safeguard their peace and security can only be expected. It is clear for all to see that the peace and stability of countries neighboring Somalia is inextricably linked to the reaching of a genuine and lasting political solution to the crisis in Somalia. It is, therefore, essential that the embargo on providing arms to Somalia be respected fully.

NEXT STEPS

Looking from the present to the future, it is obvious that a quick solution to the problems in Somalia will not be easy to achieve. Despite eight years of stateless existence, it can be said that Somalia is still not at a stage when the political situation is ripe for a quick solution.

Although there is relative stability in "Somaliland" and "Puntland" and more stability in parts of the south such as Bay and Bakool, the same cannot be said for other areas - notably Benadir (including the capital) and Lower Juba (including Kisimayo). It is essential for the peace process that in these areas the rival groups reach a 'local' accommodation. This would enable them to prepare at a second stage for countrywide efforts at national reconciliation. There is simply no alternative to the "bottom-up, peace-dividend" approach adopted by IGAD. The decisions taken by the IGAD Heads of State in Djibouti in March 1998 remain as relevant today as they were then. The fact that the IGAD approach advocates a political (and non-military) solution and is founded on the desires of the Somalis themselves, is further indication of the validity of the IGAD strategy.

The fact that the IGAD approach has not yielded quick results should not by any means be considered as failure. The crisis is not simple and has been going on for years. Some have vested interest in the prolongation of the crisis. Those concerned with the Somali problem will need to continue to grapple with the following questions:

- How can the Somali groups/actors come to a binding agreement? How can power be shared?
- Are the leaders representative of their communities?
- How do we encourage and assist the areas that have achieved peace, and how can others follow suit?
- How can the International community speak with one voice?

At the same time the peace process will have to help the Somalis address issues such as atrocities that have been committed, the confiscation of public and private properties, and illegal activities such as money-laundering, as well as arms and drug trafficking.

Equally of urgent concern is the need to ensure that the peace dividend materializes. There is no point in talking about the peace dividend if funds are not going to be available for the rehabilitation of Somalia. The lack of commitment by the international community on this matter is of great worry. Funds from the Lome Convention are running out and other sources of assistance are drying up for lack of interest. It is particularly important to remember that Somalia is not only facing a political crisis. Its people have been bearing the brunt of a humanitarian catastrophe and not for a short time. What is, therefore, of the essence is for the international community and the UN to get more firmly on board current efforts to bring peace and national reconciliation without giving up hope.

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1999/883
17 August 1999

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 16 AUGUST 1999 FROM THE CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to transmit herewith, in the interest of fairness and balance, the text of the concluding remarks by Mwalimu Julius Nyerere, the facilitator of the Burundi Peace Negotiations (see annex), which, to an extent, seem a subject matter under the letter dated 23 July 1999 from the Permanent Representative of Burundi addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/1999/816).

It is noteworthy that, while the facilitator did not single out any party, he was obviously distressed at the lack of progress made at the negotiations' fifth committee session.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Richard T. DOGANI
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

99-23834 (E) 180899

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Annex

Concluding remarks by the facilitator, Mwalimu Julius Nyerere, at the plenary closing meeting of the fifth committee session of 17 July 1999

Greetings, since I know that you are continuing your work and I am leaving for Dar-es-Salaam. Last time, before we left, I expressed great satisfaction for the work we had done during that session. The atmosphere was good and there was a lot of seriousness for the work of negotiations. I expressed satisfaction and the hope that when we met again we would have the same atmosphere and speed up the negotiations. When we met two weeks ago and I received the proposal of the Partenariat (Government) in writing, I thought that now we will really be able to negotiate.

Now I would be less than honest if I did not express my deep dissatisfaction with the amount of work done. We have wasted these two weeks! You have been extremely productive but productive producing communiqués and press releases full of insults. The atmosphere for negotiations has been completely soured, and in some committees no work has taken place at all because some delegations have attempted to block any kind of progress. Last week, when I left for Algiers, I knew from the first day there were difficulties because some delegates decided to use the unfortunate events of violence in Burundi to boycott the negotiations.

I thought that, after expressing our concerns, we would continue with the work. When I spoke about what was going on in Arusha, I spoke extremely optimistically. Even when President Buyoya asked, I told him the same. The excuses given for wasting these two weeks, as well as money, time and hope, was the continued violence in Burundi. We all agreed that continued violence, while we are trying seriously to negotiate, is unacceptable. That is why a year ago we insisted that the Government and the armed groups should agree to suspend hostilities during the whole period of the negotiations. This did not happen, and I have two problems here. This time I will explain this issue in some detail because of the confusion and misinformation concerning this issue of continued violence and disrespect for the commitment you made. We have the problem arising from the parties that did sign the agreement to suspend hostilities. The remaining problem, which we have had for the whole year, is that the Government and its allies have refused to remove the reservations they registered when signing the declaration to suspend hostilities. That is the first problem, of whose who signed. Then we have another problem that is raised as a kind of ritual every time we meet. This is the problem of those parties that were not party to that agreement but are armed groups and the desirability of those groups being brought here so they can participate in these negotiations. And in particular there is the issue of someone called Jean-Bosco. Every time we meet this question of Jean-Bosco comes up. The impression is given that everyone wants Jean-Bosco to come except Mwalimu. This is a lie! I want Jean-Bosco to come. But you know the problem about Jean-Bosco. We have agreed on the rules of procedure and the determination of who takes part in these negotiations is in accordance with those rules. It is in accordance with those rules that any additional participants who are not here

could be agreed upon to participate. I have tried to argue the case of observer participation and I did not get them in.

Jean-Bosco represents a breakaway group from the Conseil national pour la défense de la démocratie (CNDD). CNDD is a party to these negotiations. If I simply invite Jean-Bosco to come - to come as what, as a member of CNDD or as a separate group? If he is coming as a member of CNDD it has nothing to do with me. It would be an invitation from his leader Nyangoma. But they are quarrelling. So I myself have made a number of proposals of how we can get Jean-Bosco to come. (1) If he wants to come as a member of CNDD, he can have reconciliation with his leader, Nyangoma. If he has this reconciliation with his leader of course he can come. He can come as part of the delegation of CNDD. If that is not possible, I have made another suggestion. (2) If he wants to come as the leader of CNDD, he should replace Nyangoma in accordance with the constitution of CNDD. If he replaces Nyangoma on the basis of their constitution, I will of course invite him. I invite the authentic leader based on their constitution. (3) My proposal number three is that if proposals 1 and 2 aren't possible, then Jean-Bosco can form his own party, a separate party, which has nothing to do with CNDD. I will invite him, and if Nyangoma and any other group object I would ask them why? I would invite him, but my invitation does not mean he would be automatically accepted. He would still have to be approved by the plenary in accordance with the rules of procedure. But I would put forward the case. If that is not possible we must ask why? The fourth suggestion is that we arrange discrete talks between Jean-Bosco and President Buyoya.

However, it is just possible Jean-Bosco does not want to come to Arusha. There is this ritual. At present this Jean-Bosco is a very important person. I send messages to contact him and he is like the queen of the white ants. It is difficult to reach him. I try to use his brother here to get hold of him. I cannot get hold of him. This young man is extremely important. He is extremely important, and he can also be intelligent. He might ask himself, why should I go to Arusha?

If he comes to Arusha he is simply number 19. He would cease to be extremely important. I am prepared to make a different type of arrangement for him to participate in these talks. I can arrange discrete talks as we did for Buyoya to meet Nyangoma.

So on this issue of Jean-Bosco I have been trying, as a facilitator, to make all of these suggestions to facilitate his attendance here. (1) Reconciliation with Nyangoma; (2) replace Nyangoma in accordance with the constitution of CNDD; (3) to form his own party; and (4) discrete talks with President Buyoya. However, each of these suggestions has been rejected by the Government of Burundi, not by Jean-Bosco. And yet, every time we meet, you say, Mwalimu, you must invite him.

All of these suggestions have been rejected. When I last met Buyoya and mentioned the possibility of arranging these discrete talks he told me he talks to Jean-Bosco. Buyoya, show me that you are talking to him. You (deputy speaker Nzojibwami), talk to your brother. I can't reach him and you talk to him yet somehow you blame the facilitation. Since you go on making these

noises, then make a suggestion as to how we can get your brother Jean-Bosco here. As a facilitator, I have put forward all four of the suggestions and not one of them is being accepted. So give me better suggestions for how we can get this group involved.

Having said that, and admitting the need to involve everybody in these talks and the desirability of getting everyone to participate in these talks, I have emphasized all the time that we should go ahead with the negotiations. To use the absence of some groups, or to use the continued violence as a reason for not negotiating, I do not understand. We are here for the purpose of negotiating so that we can discover a way of bringing peace permanently to Burundi. However regrettable violence is, to use it as an excuse not to negotiate is irresponsible. It is not responsible at all! I still urge that we have no other duty but to continue negotiating seriously. We have wasted these two weeks.

We are coming to the end of this session and I have consulted about the next session, and the suggestion is that we should meet on 6 September. I hope that when we meet we shall really negotiate seriously. If I can get the necessary finances I will want to allow all the time we need until we complete our negotiations. We are too leisurely in these negotiations. We have been going on for a whole year and we still have very little to show. Finances allowing, we should sit and complete our committee work. In the meantime, between now and 6 September, if any committee would want to meet we will arrange a meeting. Also, in the interim between now and September, I will be carrying out consultations to see how we can speed up our work. So when we meet I will have done this.

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17 August 1999

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GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Fifty-third session
Agenda item 45
THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN AND
ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL
PEACE AND SECURITY

SECURITY COUNCIL
Fifty-fourth year

Identical letters dated 17 August 1999 from the Permanent Representative of Afghanistan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to forward herewith a letter dated 17 August 1999 from Burhanuddin Rabbani, President of the Islamic State of Afghanistan (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 45, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Dr. A. G. Ravan FARHADI
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

99-23810 (E) 170899

ANNEX

Letter dated 17 August 1999 from the President of Afghanistan addressed to the Secretary-General

Further to my letter dated 1 August 1999 on the large-scale crimes against humanity committed by the Pakistani-Taliban troops in their recent drive of ethnic cleansing against the civilian populations of the vast territories in the Shamali plains and the provinces of Parwan and Kapisa (S/1999/838), I should like to inform you of the latest upsurge of atrocities by the Taliban militia and the Pakistani military personnel, who twice in less than 10 days have been undertaking vicious military onslaughts.

Having realized that the latest situation in Afghanistan constitutes one of the most calamitous of human tragedies, it is a matter of dismay that despite your expressions of concern thereon, for which the Islamic State of Afghanistan remains appreciative, the expected reaction by the Organization of the United Nations has been inadequate and inconsequential.

The Pakistani and Taliban troops continue to barbarously pursue their campaign of systematic ethnic cleansing and genocide by means of scorched-earth policy. In addition to troop mobilization, heavy aerial bombardment and ground artillery barrage, they have targeted civilian neighbourhoods. The widespread use of hundreds of incendiary and cluster bombs, the levelling and burning down of entire villages, the mass killing of hundreds of innocent civilians, mostly women and children and the forced displacement of over 40,000 women, elderly and children to the barren hot deserts of Jalalabad, where a dozen women and children have died daily from excessive heat and lack of water and food, in addition to the already 300,000 internally displaced refugees, all present the latest predicament and catastrophe in Afghanistan. Also, the latest crackdown by the Taliban in Kabul, with the arrest of thousands of people at Khair Khana on the northern outskirts of the city, where over 10,000 were forcibly deported and sought refuge after the 28 July Pakistani-Taliban attack on their villages in the Shamali plains, is another dimension of the ongoing genocide.

If it were to be claimed that the international community, non-governmental organizations and aid agencies had adopted an attitude of indifference, it would not be an exaggeration.

Justice and equal rights of mankind - two sacred principles - having always been attributed to be the guiding criteria by aid agencies and the international community, against the backdrop of the latest tragedy, have led to a predominant impression among our people that such notions are nothing more than empty rhetoric, bearing no weight whatsoever. It is exactly here that the Afghan nation, instead of forwarding their appeal to world leaders, take the liberty to express their grief to the conscience of the peoples of the world, and rather ask them for assistance.

It is my earnest anticipation that you, with due consideration of the extent of the current catastrophe in Afghanistan, would render your utmost in the cessation of foreign aggression in the country, and an immediate provision of humanitarian assistance for the victims of the latest tragedy.

(Signed) Burhanuddin RABBANI
President
Islamic State of Afghanistan

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1999/885
18 August 1999
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

IDENTICAL LETTERS DATED 17 AUGUST 1999 FROM THE CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF KUWAIT TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you that on Wednesday, 11 August 1999, a Kuwaiti coastguard patrol arrested a wooden boat named Naurani inside Kuwaiti territorial waters. The boat was coming from Iraq and flying the United Arab Emirates flag.

Once the boat and its crew of 10 had been detained, it was discovered to have an export certificate from the port of Basra and to be carrying cotton seed, 75 cartons of infant milk powder and 25 cartons of infant feeding bottles, in clear and flagrant violation of the economic sanctions imposed on Iraq pursuant to the relevant Security Council resolutions.

This incident demonstrates beyond any doubt that the evil Iraqi regime is abusing the oil-for-food programme and that, far from distributing to the Iraqi people the humanitarian goods that it imports under that humanitarian programme, it is in fact exporting them outside the country, regardless of its own people's needs. The incident also demonstrates that the Iraqi regime is indifferent to the suffering of its people and only interested in exploiting that suffering as propaganda in order to achieve its aims and political purposes, namely, to have the sanctions lifted without having to implement the relevant Security Council resolutions.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Mansour Ayyad AL-OTAIBI
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

99-23946 (E) 180899 180899

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1999/885*
20 August 1999
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

IDENTICAL LETTERS DATED 17 AUGUST 1999 FROM THE CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF KUWAIT TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

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I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Mansour Ayyad AL-OTAIBI
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

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* Reissued for technical reasons.

99-24156 (E) 200899

UNITED
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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1999/886
17 August 1999
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: FRENCH

LETTER DATED 13 AUGUST 1999 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF FINLAND TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to bring to your attention the declaration on the situation in Afghanistan issued on 10 August 1999 by the Presidency of the European Union (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the text of this letter and its annex distributed as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Marjatta RASI
Permanent Representative of Finland
to the United Nations

99-23816 (E) 170899 170899

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Annex

[Original: English and French]

Declaration on the situation in Afghanistan issued on 10 August 1999 by the Presidency of the European Union

The European Union expresses its profound concern at the recent escalation of the military confrontation in Afghanistan. The European Union is dismayed that the Taliban should have ignored the call in the Tashkent Declaration for the Afghan conflict to be settled through peaceful political negotiation and should have instead launched a major offensive.

The European Union appeals to the warring parties to cease fighting immediately and to return to the negotiating table. The European Union reiterates its stand on Afghanistan, expressed in the common position of January 1999, and will continue to give its full support to the United Nations efforts in promoting peace and stability in Afghanistan.

The European Union is particularly concerned about the suffering the fighting is causing to the civilian population and about the deteriorating humanitarian condition of the increasing number of internally displaced persons. All the parties should abide by the principles of international law, including respect for universal human rights and humanitarian law, and ensure free and safe access for humanitarian aid.

The European Union is profoundly disturbed by the reports of forced deportation of civilians by the Taliban from their places of residence. The European Union urges the Taliban to end this practice immediately and to allow those forcibly deported to return.

The European Union call upon all those States which interfere in the internal affairs of Afghanistan to stop. The European Union further calls on the neighbouring States to prevent the flow of arms and personnel from and through their countries and to use their influence with Afghan factions to support the United Nations peace efforts.

The Central and Eastern European countries associated with the European Union, the associated countries Cyprus and Malta, and the European Free Trade Association countries Iceland and Norway, members of the European Economic Area, align themselves with this declaration.